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ABSTRACT
This paper distinguishes between target-earnings and life-cycle motivations for return migration by
examining how Philippine migrants’ return decisions respond to major, unexpected exchange rate
changes in their overseas locations (due to the Asian financial crisis). Overall, the evidence favors
the life-cycle explanation: more favorable exchange rate shocks lead to fewer migrant returns. A
10% improvement in the exchange rate reduces the 12-month return rate by 1.4 percentage points.
However, some migrants appear motivated by target-earnings considerations: in households with
intermediate foreign earnings, favorable exchange rate shocks have the least effect on return
migration, but lead to increases in household investment.
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Between 1975 and the year 2000, the number of individuals living outside their countries of birth
more than doubled to 175 million, or 2.9% of world population (United Nations (2002)).1 While
migration ﬂows from poor to rich countries gain the most attention, return ﬂo w so fm i g r a n t st o
their countries of origin are substantial. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) estimate that 17.5% of
immigrants who arrived in the United States between January 1, 1975 and April 1, 1980 had left
the country by the end of that period. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) estimate an upper bound of
50% for the remigration rate of the 1971 US immigrant cohort by January 1979.2
Why would migrant workers in rich countries ever return to poorer countries of origin? In
t h ef a c eo fs u b s t a n t i a lw a g ed i ﬀerentials, return migration is a puzzle for exclusively income-
maximizing models of migration (as in Sjastaad (1962) and Harris and Todaro (1970)). Return
migration becomes sensible in the context of household utility maximization over a ﬁnite horizon,
when migrants prefer consumption in the home country to consumption overseas (as in Hill (1987)
and Djajic and Milbourne (1988)). Temporary stays overseas are used to accumulate resources
for later use in the home country, either for consumption or investment.
In current research on return migration, there is so far no consensus on the extent to which
the durations of migrants’ stays overseas are determined primarily by straightforward life-cycle
considerations, as opposed to being driven by the need to reach target-earnings levels. By ‘life-
cycle’ considerations, I mean simply that households choose the length of stay overseas that
balances the marginal beneﬁt from higher savings overseas (and thus higher lifetime consumption)
against the marginal utility cost of overseas work (as in Stark, Helmenstein, and Yegorov (1997)
and Dustmann (2003)). On the other hand, when households face borrowing constraints and
minimum investment levels, lengths of stay overseas can be determined by the amount of time
needed to accumulate a ‘target-earnings’ level, as in Piore (1979) and Mesnard (2004).3
Distinguishing between the two alternative motivations for return migration is important,
because the return decisions of ‘life-cycle’ migrants and ‘target-earners’ can respond very diﬀer-
ently to changes in overseas economic conditions. For ‘life-cycle’ migrants, improved economic
1By contrast, world population grew by just 49% over the same time period (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002).
2Outﬂows of migrants from Europe have also been large (see Dustmann (1996)). Return migration is not just
a recent phenomenon: US departure statistics indicate that almost one-third (4.8 million) of the 15.7 million US
immigrants who arrived between 1907 and 1957 had departed by the latter year (LaLonde and Topel (1997)).
Chiswick and Hatton (2003) note that return migration exceeded immigration to the US during the 1930s.
3Empirical tests of ‘target-earnings’ models of intertemporal labor supply in the U.S. include Camerer, et al.
(1997) and Farber (2003).
1conditions in host countries–say, increased wages–can lead to longer overseas stays (as long as
substitution eﬀects dominate any income eﬀects).4 For ‘target-earners’, on the other hand, im-
proved economic conditions should lead to shorter overseas stays, as migrants reach their earnings
goals more quickly.
This paper begins by discussing migration and household investment in theory. When house-
holds face borrowing constraints and minimum investment thresholds, both potential reasons for
return migration emerge. The main theoretical prediction is that ‘life-cycle’ migrants are those
at the lowest and highest ends of the foreign wage distribution, while migrants with intermediate
foreign wages are ‘target-earners’. In essence, ‘target-earners’ are those for whom the minimum
investment threshold is just binding: they prefer investing at the minimum threshold to not
investing at all, but if possible would have preferred lower investment levels (and shorter stays
overseas). They therefore stay overseas only until their savings reach the minimum investment
threshold. By contrast, the foreign wages of ‘life-cycle’ migrants are either too low to ever consider
investing, or high enough that they choose above-minimum investment levels.
Empirically, attempts to distinguish between the two alternatives typically examine the cor-
relation between return migration and migrants’ overseas earnings. The evidence has been incon-
clusive. Borjas (1989) ﬁnds among the foreign-born in the US that higher earnings are associated
with less return migration. By contrast, Dustmann (2003) documents, among immigrants in Ger-
many, that higher migrant wages (instrumented by parental education) are associated with more
return migration (shorter overseas stays). Constant and Massey (2002) ﬁnd no statistically sig-
niﬁcant relationship between earnings and migrant returns in the same German dataset, although
migrants who are unemployed or marginally employed are more likely to return.5
Other studies have sought evidence that migrants are target-earners by examining correlations
among migrant earnings, return migration, and entrepreneurship. In a sample of Tunisian return
migrants, Mesnard (2004) documents that migrants were more likely to become entrepreneurs
upon return if they had accumulated higher savings overseas. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002)
ﬁnd that higher migrant earnings are associated with shorter migration durations for Turkish
migrants who become entrepreneurs upon return.
4Stark, Helmenstein, and Yegorov (1997) and Dustmann (2003) discuss the opposing substitution and income
eﬀects of foreign wage changes.
5Other work on the correlates of return migration includes DaVanzo (1983), Merkle and Zimmermann (1992),
and Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). Fox and Stark (1987) use retrospective data in the Mexican Migration Project
dataset for 1982-83 to document a positive correlation between hours worked by Mexicans in the US (conditional
on being in the US) and the US-Mexican exchange rate, but do not examine return migration.
2A central methodological concern with existing empirical work on this topic is that the in-
dependent variable of interest–foreign earnings–is not randomly assigned across migrants, so
any observed relationship between foreign earnings and return migration may simply be caused
by unobserved third factors. For example, a ﬁnding that migrants with higher earnings have
shorter lengths of stay overseas need not imply that higher earnings cause shorter migration du-
rations. Rather, higher-wage migrants could simply have other characteristics that make early
return attractive (such as better job prospects at home, or stronger family ties).6
This paper exploits a unique quasi-experiment that generated sudden changes in migrant eco-
nomic conditions, making possible a causal estimate of the eﬀect of migrant economic conditions
on return migration. In so doing, it also sheds light on the relative importance of life-cycle versus
target-earnings explanations for return migration.
In June 1997, 6% of Philippine households had one or more members working overseas. These
overseas members were working in dozens of foreign countries, many of which experienced sudden
changes in exchange rates due to the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis. Crucially for the empirical
analysis, there was substantial variation in the size of the exchange rate shock experienced by
migrants. Between July 1997 and June 1998, the US dollar and currencies in the Middle Eastern
destinations of Filipino workers rose 40% in value against the Philippine peso. Over the same
time period, by contrast, the currencies of Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan rose by only 22%, 24%,
and 27%, while those of Malaysia and Korea actually fell slightly against the peso.7
T h es i z eo fe x c h a n g er a t es h o c k sa c r o s sd i ﬀererent migrant location countries was unexpected,
and so the causal impact of the exchange rate shock on return migration is identiﬁed. I use panel
household survey data on Philippine households with members working overseas, and examine
migrant returns to these households over a 12-month window immediately following the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis.
The ﬁrst main ﬁnding of this paper is that, on the whole, more favorable exchange rate
shocks lead to fewer migrant returns. The regression analysis indicates that a 10% improvement
in the exchange rate reduces the 12-monthr e t u r nr a t eb y1 . 4p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t s . 8 Figure 1
6Conducting the analysis in a panel setting–where changes in foreign earnings can be related to changes in
migration duration–should do better at controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, but concerns about causality
still arise. For example, family events at home (say, worsening parental health) may lead to shorter overseas stays,
and also lead migrants to increase their earnings in the time they have remaining overseas.
7I describe the exchange rate index in section 3.1 below.
8An increase in the exchange rate simultaneously raises the Philippine-currency value of foreign wages and of
accumulated savings held overseas. If increases in overseas savings raise return rates (a wealth eﬀect), the negative
estimated eﬀect of exchange rate shocks on return rates understates the impact of pure foreign wage changes on
return rates.
3illustrates the bivariate relationship, displaying the 12-month migrant return rate for households
experiencing diﬀerent exchange rate shocks (higher values of the shock variable are ‘better’).
While the exchange rate shocks can reasonably be taken as exogenous, I present additional tests
conﬁrming that the results are not driven either by pre-existing diﬀerences in return rates from
diﬀerent countries, or by heterogeneity in the impact of the post-crisis economic downturn on
households in the Philippines that might be correlated with pre-crisis migrant locations. In
addition, there is little indication that the results are being driven by job terminations correlated
w i t ht h ee x c h a n g er a t es h o c k s .
Overall, the ﬁnding that more favorable exchange rate shocks lead to fewer migrant returns
supports the ‘life-cycle’ explanation for return migration. A positive exchange rate shock raises
the marginal beneﬁt of staying overseas (by raising the domestic-currency value of foreign wages),
and leads to less return migration on the margin.
The second main ﬁnding of this paper is that–even though life-cycle considerations seem to
dominate on the whole–migrants from a subset of households appear to be target-earners. The
eﬀect of the exchange rate shock on returns is greatest for households with the lowest and highest
values of a foreign wage index, and lowest for those with intermediate values of the index. In
households with intermediate values of the foreign wage index, the exchange rate shocks lead to
increases in variables associated with household investment. These results are consistent with the
theoretical prediction that the migrants most likely to be target-earners are those in the middle
of the foreign wage distribution: positive exchange rate shocks make target-earners more likely
to return home and to invest (because they become more likely to have reached the minimum
investment threshold).
Aside from contributing to research on international migration, this paper is also related to
an important body of research that examines the impact of ﬁnancial market imperfections on
entrepreneurship in developing countries.9 This paper’s ﬁnding that some migrants are target-
earners suggests that credit constraints in developing countries have eﬀects far beyond their
borders.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses return migration in theory. Section
3 provides an overview of international labor migration from the Philippines, and describes the
post-Asian crisis exchange rate shocks. Section 4 outlines the data used and the empirical strategy,
and presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
9For example, Aghion and Bolton (1996), Banerjee and Newman (1993), and Paulson and Townsend (2001). In
the developed-country context, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998) are also relevant.
42 Return migration in theory
What does economic theory tell us about the determinants of migration durations? How can a
quasi-experiment–such as migrants’ exchange rate shocks–be used to shed light on the rela-
tive importance of potentially diverse reasons for return? I outline here a theoretical model of
migration and household investment, and highlight the theoretical impact of favorable exchange
rate shocks. The model and results are described qualitatively in this section, while the model is
formally presented in the Theory Appendix (subsection 6.1 below).10
Assume that households with ﬁnite planning horizons each have two members, one of whom
has the option of working overseas for a wage higher than the domestic wage. Households also
may invest in an enterprise that allows higher domestic earnings, but face borrowing constraints
and a minimum investment threshold. Households prefer consumption at home to consumption
overseas, so overseas work is purely intended to accumulate resources for future investment and/or
consumption. The only source of heterogeneity across households is their foreign wage per period
overseas. Households choose the number of periods they work overseas, the number of periods
they save before investing, and savings rates in each period. The model is solved via numerical
simulation, assuming a speciﬁc parameterization of the model.
Two types of migrants emerge, diﬀerentiated on the basis of the primary motivation for return
migration. Table 1 provides an overview of the types and their characteristics.
First, there are what might be called life-cycle migrants, who make their return decisions on
an essentially neoclassical basis: they simply choose the length of stay overseas that balances the
marginal beneﬁt from higher savings overseas (and thus higher lifetime consumption) against the
marginal utility cost of overseas work. Life-cycle migrants are divided into two sub-types, which
I call ‘unconstrained investors’ and ‘non-investors’. ‘Unconstrained investors’ are households
w h o s em i g r a n t sh a v et h ehighest foreign wages. Their lifetime earnings are high enough that
entrepreneurial investment occurs relatively early in the lifetime. After the investment is made,
these migrants may continue to accumulate savings overseas for some time. ‘Non-investors’, on
the other hand, have lifetime earnings that are too low to ever contemplate making a household
entrepreneurial investment (because of the minimum investment threshold). These are households
w h o s em i g r a n t sh a v et h elowest values of the foreign wage. What unconstrained investors and
10The model has basic similarities with Stark, et al (1997), Dustmann (2003), and Mesnard (2004). The model
is closest to Mesnard (2004), with the primary diﬀerences being that I assume a minimum investment level instead
of a sunk investment cost, and allow the period of migration to diﬀer from the period of savings prior to enterprise
investment.
5non-investors have in common is that they both are staying overseas on the margin solely to
accumulate savings that help raise future consumption levels. In other words, life-cycle migrants
return in order to consume.
The second general type of migrant is the target-earner. Target-earners are migrants who
choose to make an entrepreneurial investment at the minimum investment level. In a neoclassical
world without a minimum investment level, these migrants would have preferred a shorter migra-
tion duration and a smaller entrepreneurial investment, but they prefer investing at the minimum
investment level to not investing at all. Target-earners work overseas only until they have saved
the minimum investment level, after which they return immediately and the household invests
in the entrepreneurial enterprise (return migration and entrepreneurial investment are simulta-
neous). These households have migrants with intermediate values of foreign earnings: if their
foreign earnings were much lower they would choose not to invest at all (and be ‘non-investors’),
and at substantially higher foreign earnings they would invest more than the minimum (and be
‘unconstrained investors’). Unlike life-cycle migrants, therefore, target-earners return in order to
invest.
T h em o d e lp r e d i c t st h a tt h ei m p a c to faf a v o r a b l ee x c h a n g er a t es h o c k( e ﬀectively, a simulta-
neous increase in the foreign wage and the value of savings held overseas) can diﬀer for life-cycle
migrants and target-earners. A favorable exchange rate shock reduces return rates for life-cycle
migrants: migrants from both unconstrained-investor and non-investor households remain over-
seas on the margin purely to accumulate savings for future consumption, and the exchange rate
shock raises the marginal value of staying overseas.11 But favorable exchange rate shocks increase
return rates for target-earners, because the exchange rate shock can lead them to reach their
target earnings level more quickly.
A positive exchange rate shock also has the highest positive impact on household investment
for target-earners. Target-earners respond this way to the shock because their migration and
investment decisions are linked: they remain overseas only until they have accumulated the
minimum investment threshold, and then simultaneously return home and invest.
In terms of the empirical analysis, these theoretical predictions suggest that the overall impact
o ft h ee x c h a n g er a t es h o c ko nm i g r a n tr e t u r nr a t e sc a ns h e dl i g h to nt h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo f
‘life-cycle’ versus ‘target-earnings’ motivations for return migration. If more favorable exchange
11Of course, the substitution eﬀect of the eﬀective foreign wage increase must dominate the income eﬀect, which
is the case in the parameterization used in the numerical simulation. In a more general model the income eﬀect
could dominate the substitution eﬀect, so that exchange rate shocks could raise return migration for life-cycle
migrants (as in Dustmann (2003) and Stark, et al (1997)).
6rate shocks reduce return migration, this would be evidence that life-cycle motivations dominate
on the whole. On the other hand, a ﬁnding that such shocks raise return migration would suggest
that target-earnings motivations are more important on average.
It is worth mentioning that the estimated overall impact of the exchange rate shock on return
rates should be more positive than the impact of a similarly-sized pure foreign wage change.T h e
exchange rate shock is a joint shock to the domestic-currency value of the foreign wage and to
overseas savings. The positive wealth shock associated with the increase in the domestic-currency
value of overseas savings should raise households’ demand for migrant returns (a wealth eﬀect),
so that the estimated impact of the exchange rate shock should be more positive than a similarly-
sized pure wage shock (one that is not accompanied by a change in assets).12
The second implication of the theory for the empirical analysis is that, when pre-shock foreign
wages are heterogeneous across migrants, the impact of a favorable exchange rate shock: 1) is
most negative on migrant return rates for households with the lowest and highest foreign wages
(life-cycle migrants), and 2) is most positive on household investment rates for households with
intermediate foreign wages (target-earners). In practice, these predictions mean that the impact
of favorable exchange rate shocks on migrant return rates and on household investment should
be inverted-U shapes in the foreign wage.
The theoretical predictions contrast sharply with those of a model that relaxes the credit
constraint and allows households to borrow for investment. In such a model, the impact of a
f a v o r a b l ee x c h a n g er a t es h o c k :1 )i sm o s tn e g a t i v eo nm i g r a n tr e t u r nr a t e sf o rh o u s e h o l d sw i t h
the lowest foreign wages, with the eﬀect declining in absolute value as the foreign wage increases,
and 2) is zero on household investment rates for all households.
3 International labor migration from the Philippines
To help ameliorate rising unemployment and aggregate balance of payments problems, in 1974 the
Philippine government initiated an ‘Overseas Employment Program’ to facilitate the placement of
Filipino workers in overseas jobs. At the outset, the government directly managed the placement
of workers with employers overseas, but soon yielded the function to private recruitment agencies
and assumed a more limited oversight role. The annual number of Filipinos going overseas on
12To anticipate the empirical results, positive exchange rate movements have a negative impact on return rates
on average. Therefore, the impact of proportional foreign wage changes on returns is likely to be more negative
than the estimated impact of exchange rate shocks.
7oﬃcially-processed work contracts rose six-fold from 36,035 to 214,590 between 1975 and 1980,
and more than tripled again by 1997 to 701,272.13 Today, the government authorizes some 1,300
private recruitment agencies to place place Filipinos in overseas jobs (Diamond (2002)). Contracts
for most overseas positions are typically of two years’ initial duration, and are usually open to
renewal. For the vast majority of positions, overseas workers cannot bring family members with
them, and must go alone.
The central role in Philippine migration of temporary, legal contract work makes it distinctive.
Migration for temporary contract work is a type of international labor ﬂow that is likely to become
more and more important in coming years.
In June 1997 (immediately prior to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis), 5.9% of Philippine households
had one or more household members overseas, in a wide variety of foreign countries.14 Table
2 displays the distribution of household members working overseas by country in that month.15
Filipino workers are remarkably dispersed worldwide. Saudi Arabia is the largest single destina-
tion, with 29% of the total, and Hong Kong comes in second with roughly 12%. But no other
destination accounts for more than 10% of the total. The only other countries accounting for 6%
or more are Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, and the United States. The top 20 destinations listed in
the table account for 93.6% of overseas Filipino workers; the remainder are distributed among 31
other locations.
Table 3 displays summary statistics on the characteristics of overseas Filipino workers in the
same survey. 1,793 overseas workers were overseas in June 1997 in the households included in
the empirical analysis (see the Data Appendix for details on the construction of the household
sample). The overseas workers have a mean age of 34.4 years. 38% are single, and 53% are
male. ‘Production and related workers’ and ‘domestic servants’ are the two largest occupational
categories, each accounting for 31% of the total. 30% of overseas workers in the sample have
achieved some college education, and a further 31% have a college degree. In terms of position
13The source for these data is Philippine Yearbook 2001, Table 15.4. These ﬁgures do not include Filipinos who
go overseas without the help of government-authorized recruitment agencies. By all accounts (e.g., Cariño (1998)
and others), there was a dramatic rise in the number of Filipinos going overseas in this period, so the ﬁgures should
not reﬂect merely the collection of new data on previously undocumented worker departures.
14This statistic, and those in the following two paragraphs, are as reported in the 1997 Survey on Overseas
Filipinos and 1997 Labor Force Survey. I describe these surveys in Section 4 below.
15For 90% of individuals in the SOF, their location overseas in that month is reported explicitly. For the
remainder, a few reasonable assumptions must be made to determine their June 1997 location. See the Data
Appendix for the procedure used to determine the locations of overseas Filipinos in the SOF. Tables 2 and 3
include the exact migrants whose households were included in the empirical analysis, and so a small number of
migrants were excluded due to lack of complete data on all variables used in the analysis. This exclusion makes
next to no diﬀerence to the summary statistics.
8in the household, the most common categories are male heads of household and daughters of the
head, each accounting for 28% of overseas workers; sons of head account for 15%, female heads
or spouses of heads 12%, and other relations 16% of overseas workers. As of June 1997, the bulk
of overseas workers had been away for relatively short periods: 30% had been overseas for just
0-11 months, 24% for 12-23 months, and 15% for 24-35 months, 15% for 36-47 months, and 16%
f o r4 8m o n t h so rm o r e .
Unsurprisingly, migrants are typically located in countries substantially richer than the Philip-
pines: the mean 1996 per capita income of migrant’s location countries is $16,955.16 19% of over-
seas workers were located in countries that might be considered ‘immigration destinations’: Japan,
the USA (including Paciﬁc territories such as Guam, Marshall Islands and Northern Marianas
Islands), Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Germany.17
3.1 Shocks generated by the Asian ﬁnancial crisis
The geographic dispersion of overseas Filipinos meant that there was considerable variety in the
shocks they experienced in the wake of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, starting in July 1997. The
devaluation of the Thai baht in that month set oﬀ a wave of speculative attacks on national
currencies, primarily (but not exclusively) in East and Southeast Asia.
Figure 2 displays monthly exchange rates for selected major locations of overseas Filipinos
(expressed in Philippine pesos per unit of foreign currency, normalized to 1 in July 1996).18 The
sharp trend shift for nearly all countries after July 1997 is the most striking feature of this graph.
An increase in a particular country’s exchange rate should be considered a favorable shock to
an overseas household member in that country. (As noted in the theoretical section, positive
exchange rate shocks raise the domestic-currency value of both households’ foreign earnings and
overseas savings.)
For each country j, I construct the following measure of the exchange rate change between the
year preceding July 1997 and the year preceding June 1998:
ERCHANGEj =
Average country j exchange rate from Jul. 1997 to Jun. 1998
Average country j exchange rate from Jul. 1996 to Jun. 1997
− 1. (1)
16Figures in 1995 US dollars, and are as reported by World Development Indicators 2002. In comparison,
Philippine per capita GDP in 1996 was $1,122.
17Immigration destinations are deﬁned as countries with 5,000 or more permanent Philippine residents in 1997,
as tabulated by the Philippine government’s Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO).
18The exchange rates are as of the end of each month, and were obtained from Bloomberg L.P.
9A 10% improvement would be expressed as 0.1, a 10% decline as -0.1. Exchange rate changes
for the 20 major destinations of Filipino workers are listed in the last column of Table 2. The
changes for the United States, Hong Kong, and Middle Eastern countries were all at least 0.40.
By contrast, the exchange rate shocks for Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan were 0.22, 0.24, and 0.27,
while for Malaysia and Korea they were actually negative: -0.01 and -0.02, respectively. Among
workers in the sample, those in Indonesia experienced the worst exchange rate change over the
period (-0.39), while those in Syria experienced the most favorable change (0.43).
Unfortunately, the survey data to be used in the empirical analysis only allows migrants’ origin
households (not individual migrants) to be tracked over panel years. So the empirical analysis
examines migration return rates at the household level. I therefore construct a household-level
exchange rate shock variable as follows. Let the countries in the world where overseas Filipinos
work be indexed by j ∈ {1,2,...,J}.L e tnij indicate the number of overseas workers a household
i has in a particular country j in June 1997 (so that
PJ
j=1 nij is its total number of household







In other words, for a household with just one worker overseas in a country j in June 1997, the
exchange rate shock associated with that household is simply ERCHANGEj. For households
with workers in more than one foreign country in June 1997, the exchange rate shock associated
with that household is the weighted average exchange rate change across those countries, with each
country’s exchange rate weighted by the number of household workers in that country.19 Because
the question of interest is the impact of shocks experienced by migrants on return migration, the
sample for analysis is restricted to households with one or more members working overseas prior
to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis (in June 1997).
In addition, the Philippine economy experienced a decline in economic growth after the onset
of the crisis. Annual real GDP contracted by 0.8% in 1998, as compared to growth of 5.2% in 1997
and 5.8% in 1996 (World Bank 2002). The urban unemployment rate (unemployed as a share of
total labor force) rose from 9.5% to 10.8% between 1997 and 1998, while the rural unemployment
rate went from 5.2% to 6.9% over the same period (Philippine Yearbook (2001), Table 15.1). Any
19Of the 1,615 households included in the analysis, 1,455 (90.1%) had just one member working overseas in June
1997. 139 households (8.6%) had two, 18 households (1.1%) had three, and three households (0.2%) had four
members working overseas in that month.
10eﬀects of the domestic economic downturn common to all sample households (as well as eﬀects of
t h ec r i s i st h a td i ﬀer according to households’ observed pre-crisis characteristics) will be accounted
for in the empirical analysis, as described in the next section.
4 Impact of exchange rate shocks on return migration
The primary goal of the empirical analysis is to determine whether migrant return rates are
positively or negatively associated with the exchange rate shock. Positive exchange rate shocks
should lead to lower return rates if ‘life-cycle’ migrants predominate. On the other hand, exchange
rate shocks should lead to higher return rates if migrants are primarily ‘target-earners’. In
addition, the empirical analysis will test speciﬁc implications of the model of migration and
household investment, when households face borrowing constraints and minimum investment
thresholds (as described above in section 2).
In the following subsections, I describe the data and sample construction, the characteristics
of sample households, the regression speciﬁcation and some empirical issues, and then present
empirical results.
4.1 Data and sample construction
The empirical analysis uses data from four linked household surveys conducted by the National
Statistics Oﬃce of the Philippine government, covering a nationally-representative household
sample: the Labor Force Survey (LFS), the Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF), the Family
Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), and the Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS).
The LFS is administered quarterly to inhabitants of a rotating panel of dwellings in January,
April, July, and October, and the other three surveys are administered with lower frequency as
riders to the LFS. Usually, one-fourth of dwellings are rotated out of the sample in each quarter,
but the rotation was postponed for ﬁve quarters starting in July 1997, so that three-quarters of
dwellings included in the July 1997 round were still in the sample in October 1998 (one-fourth of
the dwellings had just been rotated out of the sample). The analysis of this paper takes advantage
of this fortuitous postponement of the rotation schedule to examine changes in households between
1997 and 1998.
Survey enumerators note whether the household currently living in the dwelling is the same as
the household surveyed in the previous round; only dwellings inhabited continuously by the same
11household from July 1997 to October 1998 are included in the sample for analysis.20 Households
are only included in the sample for empirical analysis if they reported having one or more members
overseas in June 1997 (immediately prior to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis). See the Data Appendix
for details regarding the contents of the surveys and the construction of the sample for analysis.
4.2 Characteristics of sample households
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the 1,614 households used in the empirical analysis. The
top row displays summary statistics for the exchange rate shock. The mean change in the shock
index was 0.32, with a standard deviation of 0.13.
The main dependent variable in the analysis is the ‘12-month migrant return rate,’ the number
of household migrant workers who returned between July 1997 and June 1998 divided by the
number of household members working overseas in June 1997. The mean of this variable is 0.08.
The mean number of household overseas workers in June 1997 is 1.11. The median cash
receipts from overseas was 25,000 pesos (US$962) in Jan-Jun 1997.21 Pre-crisis cash receipts from
overseas were substantial as a share of household income, with a median of 0.37.
Compared to other Philippine households, households in the sample tend to have higher initial
(Jan-Jun 1997) income per capita. 51% of sample households are in the top quartile of the national
household income per capita distribution, and 28% are in the next-highest quartile. Median pre-
crisis income per capita in the household is 15,197 pesos (US$584). Mean pre-crisis household size
is 6.17 members (including overseas members).22 68% of sample households are urban, compared
to the national ﬁgure of 59%.
4.3 Regression speciﬁcation
In investigating the impact of exchange rate shocks on changes in the migrant return rate between
1997 and 1998, the basic regression equation is:
RETit = β0 + β1 (ERSHOCKit)+εit (3)
Let t =1 9 9 8 . For household i, RETit is the migrant return rate in the 12 months leading up
20As discussed in Yang (2004), there is no evidence that attrition from the sample between 1997 and 1998 is
correlated with a household’s exchange rate shock.
21Philippine pesos are converted to US dollars at the ﬁrst-half 1997 exchange rate of roughly 26 pesos per US$1.
22The corresponding pre-crisis (Jan-Jun 1997) national median of income per capita for all households is 7,944
pesos. The national mean household size in July 1997 was 5.27.
12to June 1998. ERSHOCKit is the exchange rate shock for household i in the year leading up to
June 1998, as deﬁned above in (2). εit is a mean-zero error term. Standard errors are clustered
according to the June 1997 location of the household’s overseas worker(s).23
The constant term, β0, accounts for the average change in outcomes across all households in
the sample. This accounts for the shared impact on migrant returns of the decline in Philippine
economic growth after the onset of the crisis.
The coeﬃcient of interest is β1, the impact of the exchange rate shock on the migrant return
rate. The identiﬁcation assumption is that if exchange rates in the locations of overseas Filipino
workers had remained unchanged from 1997 through 1998, then migrant return rates would not
have varied systematically across households on the basis of their overseas workers’ locations.
While this identiﬁcation assumption is not possible to test directly, it is possible to conduct
partial tests for diﬀerent types of violations of the identiﬁcation assumption (potential threats to
causal inference).
A ﬁrst potential violation of the identiﬁcation assumption would be if migrant return rates
prior to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis are correlated with the future exchange rate shocks that were
to occur in their overseas location countries after July 1997. For example, if countries that were
to experience the most favorable exchange rate shocks in the wake of the Asian crisis (such as
the US, Hong Kong, and the Gulf states) in general always had the lowest migrant return rates
(even prior to the crisis), the coeﬃcient on ERSHOCKit in equation (3) would be biased in a
negative direction. Diﬀerences in the survey rotation schedule in prior years make it impossible to
calculate analogous return rates in years prior to 1997 (household panels cannot be constructed
that span successive rounds of the Survey of Overseas Filipinos.) However, an imperfect (but likely
still informative) return rate from 1996-1997 can be constructed using retrospective questions on
migrant locations in the October 1997 round of the SOF (described in the Empirical Appendix,
subsection 6.3.) Deﬁne RET9697i as the observed return rate between July 1996 and June 1997
in the overseas location of household i’s migrant(s).24
I use 1996-1997 return rates in two complementary ways. First, I include the 1996-1997
return rate (at the country level) in the regression equation for the 1997-1998 return rate. If
the crisis-induced exchange rate changes happen to be correlated with pre-crisis return rates,
inclusion of the pre-crisis return rates in the regression should change the estimated coeﬃcient
23For households that had more than one overseas worker overseas in June 1997, the household is clustered
according to the location of the eldest overseas worker. This results in 50 clusters.
24For households with migrants in diﬀerent location countries, the 1996-1997 return rate variable is simply the
mean return rate over that period across the household’s migrants.
13on the exchange rate shock. Second, I directly examine the relationship between the exchange
rate shock and pre-crisis return probabilities. The Empirical Appendix (subsection 6.3 below)
describes this exercise, and ﬁnds no evidence that return probabilities in the immediately prior
12-month period (July 1996-June 1997) are correlated with future exchange rate shocks occuring
after July 1997.
The second potential violation of the identiﬁcation assumption is an omitted variable problem:
variation in post-Asian crisis migrant returns could be driven by changes in migrant job termi-
nation in the countries aﬀected by the Asian ﬁnancial crisis (which are likely to be correlated
w i t ht h ee x c h a n g er a t es h o c k s ) ,a n dn o tb yt h ee x c h a n g er a t es h o c k sper se.I fs o ,t h er e g r e s s i o n
results would not necessarily shed light on the theoretical model of return migration, in which
migrants decide for themselves when to return home.
A third potential violation of the identiﬁcation assumption is the possibility that the domes-
tic Philippine economic downturn in 1997-1998 had heterogeneous eﬀects on households in the
Philippines in a manner correlated with the locations of their overseas members (also an omitted
variable problem). This is a potential concern because households whose migrants experienced
more favorable exchange rate shocks do diﬀer along a number of pre-crisis characteristics from
households whose migrants experienced less-favorable shocks. Appendix Table 1 presents coeﬃ-
cient estimates from a regression of the household’s exchange rate shock on a number of pre-shock
characteristics of households and their overseas workers. Several individual variables are statis-
tically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating that households experienced more favorable
exchange rate shocks if they had fewer members, heads who were more educated, less educated
migrants, and migrants who had been away for longer periods prior to the crisis.25 If these pre-
crisis characteristics also help predict the impact of the domestic 1997-1998 Philippine economic
downturn on households, there may be an omitted variable problem: migrant return rates may
be responding to changes in the domestic economic conditions of their origin households, and not
the exchange rate shocks they experience overseas.
Tests for the second and third types of potential violations of the identiﬁcation assumption
involve checking whether the coeﬃcient β1 on the exchange rate shock changes when one includes
two types of right-hand-side control variables in the regression equation. First, MIGSHOCKit
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the household reports that an overseas worker from the
25Also, F-tests reject the null that some subgroups of variables are jointly equal to zero: indicators for household
per capita income percentiles; indicators for household head’s education level; indicators for household geographic
location in the Philippines; overseas workers’ months away variables; overseas workers’ education variables; and
overseas workers’ occupation variables.
14household experienced a job loss in the year preceding October 1998, and is 0 otherwise.26 In-
clusion of MIGSHOCKit in the regression controls for changes in migrant return rates due to
job termination. Second, the vector Xit−1 includes household geographic indicators and a range
of pre-crisis household and migrant characteristics.27 Inclusion of Xit−1 controls for variation
in migrant return rates explained by households’ pre-crisis characteristics, and should indirectly
account for heterogeneity in the impact of the domestic 1997-1998 Philippine economic downturn
across households (to the extent that the latter type of heterogeneity is related to the same set
of Xit−1 variables).28
With additional controls, the expanded regression equation is:
RETit = β0 +β1 (ERSHOCKit)+β2 (RET9697it)+β3 (MIGSHOCKit)+δ
0 (Xit−1)+εit (4)
4.4 Regression results
This subsection describes the impact of exchange rate shocks on return migration at the household
level. I ﬁrst describe the mean impact of the exchange rate shocks across households. I then
examine heterogeneity in the eﬀect of the shock on return migration and on investment-related
outcomes.
4.4.1 Overall impact of exchange rate shock on return migration
Table 5 presents coeﬃcient estimates from equation (3) and versions of equation (4). The ﬁrst
column presents the coeﬃcient estimate (β1) on the exchange rate shock when no other right-
26As reported in the Annual Poverty Indicators Survey of October 1998. This variable was not collected in prior
years.
27Household geographic controls are 16 indicators for regions within the Philippines and their interactions with an
indicator for urban location. Household-level controls are as follows. Income variables as reported in Jan-Jun 1997:
log of per capita household income; indicators for being in 2nd, 3rd, and top quartile of the sample distribution
of household per capita income. Demographic and occupational variables as reported in July 1997: number of
household members (including overseas members); ﬁve indicators for head’s highest level of education completed
(elementary, some high school, high school, some college, and college or more; less than elementary omitted);
head’s age; indicator for ‘head’s marital status is single’; six indicators for head’s occupation (professional, clerical,
service, production, other, not working; agricultural omitted).
Migrant controls are means of the following variables across household’s overseas workers away in June 1997:
indicators for months away as of June 1997 (12-23, 24-35, 36-47, 48 or more; 0-11 omitted); indicators for highest
education level completed (high school, some college, college or more; less than high school omitted); occupation
indicators (domestic servant, ship’s oﬃcer or crew, professional, clerical, other service, other occupation; production
omitted); relationship to household head (female head or spouse of head, daughter, son, other relation; male head
omitted); indicator for single marital status; years of age.
28In addition, to the extent that Xit−1 includes variables that explain return rates but that are themselves
uncorrelated with the exchange rate shocks, their inclusion can reduce residual variation and lead to more precise
coeﬃcient estimates on the exchange rate shock.
15hand-side variables are included in the regression, while the second column includes household
location indicators and the control variables for pre-crisis household and migrant characteristics.
The coeﬃcient estimates are almost exactly the same across the columns (-0.156 in column 1 and
-0.155 in column 2) and are both highly statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% level). Because the
coeﬃcient on the exchange rate shock is essentially unchanged when control variables are added
to the regression in column 2, there is little reason to believe that any bias is being introduced by
heterogeneity in the eﬀect of the domestic economic downturn across households in the Philippines
(as discused in subsection 4.3 above), or by any other unobserved heterogeneity correlated with
the control variables.
The third column includes as a control variable the observed return rate between July 1996
and June 1997 in the overseasl o c a t i o no fh o u s e h o l di’s migrant(s), RET9697i.A si tt u r n so u t ,t h e
pre-crisis return rate across locations has little relationship with post-crisis return probabilities:
the coeﬃcient is small in magnitude (0.041) and is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. The coeﬃcient on the exchange rate shock (-0.154) is essentially identical to the coeﬃcient
in the previous columns. There is no evidence that the estimated impact of the exchange rate
shock on migrant returns is due to a spurious correlation between pre-crisis return rates and the
exchange rate shock.
The fourth column of the table includes as a control variable the indicator for a migrant from
the household having experienced an overseas job loss in the past year (MIGSHOCKit). As one
might expect, the coeﬃcient on MIGSHOCKit is positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant. A
migrant job loss in the past year raises a household’s return rate by 0.154.
While migrant job losses do lead to higher migrant returns, including MIGSHOCKit in the
regression has only a very small eﬀect on the coeﬃcient on the exchange rate shock (reducing
it in magnitude from -0.154 to -0.141). The coeﬃcient on the exchange rate shock remains
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. There is therefore little indication that the exchange
rate shock is having its eﬀect primarily via migrant job losses (the second potential violation of
the identiﬁcation assumption described in subsection 4.3).
The coeﬃcient estimate in column 4 indicates that a 10% improvement (0.10) in the exchange
rate is associated with a 0.0141 decline in the 12-month migrant return rate. This is a large eﬀect,
equal to nearly one-ﬁfth of the mean 12-month return rate in the sample of 0.08.
In terms of the theoretical model, the fact that favorable exchange rate shocks lead to fewer
migrant returns suggests that, on average, life-cycle considerations dominate target-earnings mo-
tivations for migrant returns.
16Appendix Table 2 presents regression coeﬃcients on the full set of right-hand-side variables
from the regression in column 4 of Table 5. Return rates are higher in households whose migrants
have spent more months away. Return rates are lower in households whose migrants are in
immigration destinations, and whose household heads are more educated.
4.4.2 Heterogeneous eﬀect of shock on return migration
The theoretical model predicts that the eﬀe c to ft h ee x c h a n g er a t es h o c ko nr e t u r nr a t e sw i l lb e
heterogeneous according to a migrant’s foreign wage level. While migrants’ foreign wages are not
reported in the dataset, it is possible to construct a reasonable index of foreign wages: predicted
remittances.
4.4.2.1 Predicted remittances as an index of foreign earnings Start with the plausible
assumption that foreign wages are positively correlated with remittances sent home. Remittances
sent by the migrant to the sample household are reported in the dataset, so one might consider
using remittances directly as a proxy for foreign wages. But this approach would be subject to
the following concern: remittances sent home are likely be a very noisy proxy for the migrant’s
wages. For example, if remittances serve as insurance for migrants’ origin households, they could
ﬂuctuate substantially from one period to the next depending on whether the origin household
has experienced economic shocks, health shocks, and the like.29 Households may also have in-
termittent cash requirements (say, for school tuition) that cause remittances to ﬂuctuate from
period to period.
Ideally, then, one would capture the portion of remittances that is related to a migrant’s usual
foreign wages, and not to factors that ﬂuctuate from one period to the next. A straightforward
way to do this is to estimate the following auxiliary regression relating remittances sent home
(Rit−1)t oh o u s e h o l di in an initial period t−1 to variables that are determined prior to the period
of analysis (Zit−1):
Rit−1 = α + γZit−1 + εit−1 (5)
The vector of predetermined characteristics Zit−1 includes variables that in principle should
be correlated with foreign wage earnings of the household’s migrants. Then, for each household
29For empirical evidence on the responses of remittances to negative shocks in migrant origin locations, see Yang
(2005) and Yang and Choi (2005).
17one can construct predicted remittances b Rit−1 implied by the auxiliary regression:
b Rit−1 = α + γZit−1
Appendix Table 3 presents regression results from OLS estimation of equation (5). The de-
pendent variable is total household remittance receipts prior to the crisis (from Jan-June 1997),
in thousands of current Philippine pesos. Right-hand-side variables are means of the following
variables across the household’s migrants away in June 1997: indicators for highest education
level completed (high school, some college, college or more; less than high school omitted); oc-
cupation indicators (domestic servant, ship’s oﬃcer or crew, professional, clerical, other service,
other occupation; production omitted); indicator for ‘migrant is male’; indicator for location in
‘immigration destination’; log of 1996 per capita GDP in migrant’s location country (1995 US$).
An additional independent variable included is the number of migrants away in June 1997, as this
obviously aﬀects total household remittance receipts. The coeﬃcient estimates yield no surprises:
households receive more remittances when their migrants are better educated, in professional
occupations, male, and working in countries with higher per capita GDP. Households with more
migrants also receive more remittances. Predicted remittances range from 6,563 (US$252) to
89,665 pesos (US$3,449), with a mean of 35,943 (US$1,382) and a standard deviation of 15,609
(US$600).
4.4.2.2 Heterogeneity in eﬀe c to fe x c h a n g er a t es h o c k Predicted remittances b Rit−1
from the regression in Appendix Table 3 are used as a foreign wage index in the analysis of
heterogeneity in the eﬀect of exchange rate shocks on migrant returns.
The theoretical model predicts that in the presence of borrowing constraints and a minimum
investment threshold, the impact of the exchange rate shock on the return rate should be an
inverted-U in the foreign wage (largest for migrants with the lowest and highest foreign wages).
It is therefore useful to create indicator variables that divide households into three groups on the
basis of their foreign wage index: low, intermediate, and high. The ‘low’ group comprises house-
holds below the 30th percentile of the distribution of predicted remittances, the ‘intermediate’
group those whose predicted remittances are in the 30th-70th percentiles, and the ‘high’ group
are those whose predicted remittances are above the 70th percentile.
To test the theoretical prediction, regression equation (4) is re-estimated when the exchange
rate shock variable ERSHOCKit is interacted with indicator variables for each of these groups
18(LOWit, INTit,a n dHIGHit, respectively). Main eﬀects for INTit and HIGHit are also included
in the regression.30 To help ensure that the coeﬃcient on the interaction terms do not reﬂect
heterogeneity in the eﬀect of migrant job losses correlated with the exchange rate shock, the
regression also includes an interaction term between the MIGSHOCKit variable and the foreign
wage index indicators. Standard errors are bootstrapped to account for the existence of generated
regressors. The bootstrap sampling cluster is the location of the household’s eldest migrant.
Regression results are presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 6. The coeﬃcients on the inter-
action terms between the exchange rate shock and the foreign wage index group indicators are
in the ﬁrst three rows. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms for the lowest and highest levels
of the foreign wage index are both negative and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. For
households with in the lowest group, the coeﬃcient on the exchange rate is -0.179 and is signiﬁ-
cant at the 10% level. For households in the highest group, the coeﬃcient on the exchange rate is
-0.412 and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. By contrast, the coeﬃcient on the exchange rate shock
f o rh o u s e h o l d sw i t hi n t e r m e d i a t el e v e l so ft h ef o r e i g nw a g ei n d e x( 0 . 0 1 1 )i sa c t u a l l yp o s i t i v e ,i s
very small in magnitude, and is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In sum, the
eﬀect of the exchange rate shock on migrant returns is most negative for households with the
lowest and highest levels of the foreign wage index.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ee ﬀect of the exchange rate shock on returns has an inverted-U-shaped
relationship with a proxy for foreign wages (predicted remittances) conﬁrms the ﬁrst prediction
of the theoretical model. There is also evidence for the second prediction: that the impact of the
exchange rate shock on household investment should also show an inverted-U-shaped relationship
with the foreign wage proxy.
Household investments in entrepreneurial enterprises are not explicitly reported in the dataset,
so the analysis must focus on outcomes plausibly related to such investment activity. Several
natural proxies for household entrepreneurial investment exist.
The next two columns of Table 6 present regression results similar to those in column 1,
but where the dependent variables are changes in ownership of certain assets. In column 2, the
outcome variable is the change in an indicator for the household owning any vehicles (car, jeep,
or motorcycle), which takes on the values -1, 0, and 1.31 In column 3, the dependent variable
30Due to collinearity among the foreign wage index group indicators, the main eﬀect for LOWit is excluded.
31As described in the Data Appendix, vehicle ownership data were not recorded in July 1997, so the change in
this ownership indicator is between January 1998 and October 1998. If vehicle ownership changed by January 1998
in response to the July-December 1997 exchange rate shocks, the coeﬃcient estimates should be lower bounds of
t h et r u ee ﬀects.
19is the change in purchases of real property (land and buildings) from before to after the crisis
(Jan-Jun 1997 to Apr-Sep 1998), divided by pre-crisis (Jan-Jun 1997) household income.32 To the
extent that vehicles and real property make up part of the starting capital of an entrepreneurial
enterprise, these outcomes should also capture changes in household entrepreneurial investments.
The regression results indicate that the impact of exchange rate shocks on asset ownership is
also an inverted-U-shape in the foreign wage index. For both asset outcomes, the coeﬃcient on
the exchange rate shock interacted with the intermediate foreign wage index indicator is positive,
while the coeﬃcients on the low and high foreign wage index interaction terms are smaller in
magnitude or negative.
For the change in vehicle ownership, the coeﬃcient on the exchange rate shock for the interme-
diate group is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. A 10% improvement
(0.10) in the exchange rate for households with intermediate levels of the foreign wage index
is associated with a 3.4 percentage point increase in vehicle ownership. This is a large eﬀect,
considering that only 13% of sample households owned vehicles in the initial period.
It is also sensible to examine heterogeneity in the impact of the exchange rate shocks on
the change in household entrepreneurial income. Changes in entrepreneurial income should be
reﬂective of underlying entrepreneurial investments to the extent that such investments are pre-
requisites for ﬁrst-time entry into entrepreneurship, or entry into new types of entrepreneurship.
In column 4 of Table 6, the dependent variable is the change in household entrepreneurial
income from before to after the crisis (Jan-Jun 1997 to Apr-Sep 1998), divided by pre-crisis (Jan-
Jun 1997) household income. Consistent with the results for the changes in assets in the previous
two columns, the coeﬃcient on the exchange rate shock interacted with the intermediate foreign
wage index indicator is positive, while the interactions with the low and high foreign wage index
indicators are both negative. However, standard errors are large, so that none of the coeﬃcients
on interaction terms with the exchange rate shock are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.
Each of the investment proxies used as outcome variables in columns 2 to 4 of Table 6 is a
noisy measure of household investment. To raise the signal-to-noise ratio, it is useful to consider
as an outcome variable a linear combination of these proxies. A linear combination of the proxies
should help raise the signal-to-noise ratio if measurement errors in the proxies are not completely
32Dividing by pre-crisis household income allows coeﬃcient estimates to be interpreted as fractions of initial
household income. This speciﬁcation is preferred to the change in log real property purchases because many
households report zero real property purchases in one of the two periods.
20positively correlated with one another.
A sensible linear combination of the three investment proxies is their ﬁrst principal component:
the single index that explains the largest share of variation in the proxies.33 Following standard
practice, I normalize each of the three investment proxies to have mean zero and standard devi-
ation one before determining the ﬁrst principal component.34
In column 5 of Table 6, this ﬁrst principal component is the dependent variable in the regres-
sion. The coeﬃcient on the exchange rate shock interacted with the indicator for the intermediate
foreign wage index group is positive and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5%
level. A 10% improvement (0.10) in the exchange rate for households with intermediate levels of
the foreign wage index is associated with a 0.093 increase in the investment index. This eﬀect
amounts to roughly one-tenth of a standard deviation of the investment index. By contrast, the
interactions with the indicators for the low and high foreign wage index groups are both negative
in sign, much smaller in magnitude, and not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper takes advantage of an unusual quasi-experiment–large exchange rate shocks gener-
ated by the Asian ﬁnancial crisis–to shed light on the economics of return migration. Overall,
Philippine migrants are less likely to return home when they experience more positive exchange
rate shocks, suggesting that straightforward ‘life-cycle’ motivations dominate ‘target-earnings’
explanations for return migration. However, a subset of migrants are likely to be ‘target-earners’:
for households with intermediate levels of a foreign earnings index, more favorable exchange rate
shocks have the least eﬀect on return migration, while leading to increases in proxies for household
investment. These empirical results are consistent with a model where migration helps households
accumulate resources for investment, in the face of credit constraints and minimum investment
levels.
On average, a 10% improvement in the exchange rate reduces the 12-month migrant return
rate by 1.4 percentage points. This is a large eﬀect, amounting to nearly one-ﬁfth of the mean
33This approach is analogous to the procedure used to construct indices of intelligence ("g") from several separate
test scores (as in Cawley, Conneely, Heckman, and Vytlacil 1996) or to construct an index of crack cocaine from
several separate proxies (Fryer, Heaton, Levitt, and Murphy 2005).
34The loadings on each proxy are 0.653 for the change in entrepreneurial income, 0.609 for the change in vehicle
ownership, and 0.451 for the change in real property purchases. The ﬁrst principal component is then simply the
weighted average of the normalized variables, where the weight on each variable is the square of the loading. The
resulting investment index also has mean zero and unit standard deviation.
2112-month return rate in the sample. Positive exchange rate shocks for migrants simultaneously
raise the Philippine-currency value of foreign wages and of accumulated savings held overseas. If
increases in overseas savings lead to higher return rates (a wealth eﬀect), the negative estimated
eﬀect of exchange rate shocks on return rates is likely to understate the impact of pure foreign
wage changes on return rates.
For these results to have implications for the design of policies encouraging return migration
from developed countries, the question of generalizability must be considered. This paper has
examined the economics of return migration for a particular type of international labor ﬂow:
temporary labor migration by Filipinos, most of which is likely to be formal and in accordance
with the immigration laws of host countries. This type of international migration has become a
large phenomenon in the post-World War II period, when European countries established ‘guest-
worker’ programs, and oil-rich Gulf states initiated massive labor importation (Chiswick and
Hatton (2003)). Recognition of the potential beneﬁts for developing countries motivates current
WTO negotiations on liberalization of temporary labor movement (Winters, et al (2002)) and
other proposals for developed countries to provide temporary labor permits to workers from
developing countries (such as Rodrik (2002)).35 The success of such initiatives hinges on migrants
eventually returning to their origin countries, but past attempts to explicitly encourage return
migration have had mixed outcomes (see Zimmermann (1994)). This paper’s results therefore
apply to a particular but increasingly prominent type of international labor ﬂow.
In combination with a companion paper, Yang (2004), this paper also demonstrates the pos-
sibility of exploring the impact of international migration on households in developing countries
using existing datasets collected by national governments. The Philippines is not likely to be the
only country whose national household survey includes questions on international migration, and
so valuable future work could seek evidence in other countries of the impacts of economic shocks
faced by migrants on return migration, entrepreneurship, and other outcomes in the migrants’
source households.
6 Appendices
Three appendices follow below: the Theory Appendix, the Data Appendix, and the Empirical
Appendix.
35The Bush administration also recently proposed to provide temporary employment visas to undocumented
U.S. workers (Bumiller (2004)).
226.1 Theory Appendix: A model of migration and household invest-
ment
This section presents the model of migration and household investment described in qualitative
terms in Section 2 above.
Let each household have a planning horizon of T discrete periods, and have two working
members. Household members supply labor inelastically: one unit is supplied per period by each
member. Each household member can supply labor in the domestic labor market (at wage d).
One household member has the option of working overseas in each period, at a wage f>d ;t h e
second household member is restricted to domestic labor. (We can imagine that at least one
spouse must stay at home to care for children, or that regulations governing temporary contract
work overseas prohibit migration of entire families.)
Households also have the option of investing an amount I in a household enterprise, in which
case one (and only one) household member can choose to work in the enterprise and generate
proﬁts rI per period. If the household member works in the enterprise, she may not provide wage
labor, either domestically or overseas.36 In addition, there is a minimum investment threshold
m, below which an investment may not be made (it must be the case that I ≥ m).37 Further, let
per period proﬁts from entrepreneurship always exceed the domestic wage, even at the minimum
investment level (rm > d). To keep the analysis tractable, impose the condition that the capital
invested in the enterprise, I, may not be subsequently raised. (Say there are very high capital
adjustment costs.)
A crucial assumption is that credit markets for uncollateralized loans do not exist, so house-
holds must save the amount of desired enterprise capital before investing. But allow collateralized
lending, so that households can consume the capital invested in the enterprise. In other words,
households are allowed to take out a loan once the enterprise has been established, for the amount
I. For simplicity, assume that the interest rate on collateralized loans and the depreciation rate
of invested capital are zero. So repayment of the collateralized enterprise loan simply means
the enterprise is turned over to the lender at the end of the last period.38 Households may save
(transfer income from the current period to future periods) at a zero interest rate. Households
start with zero savings, and save from both domestic and foreign income sources.
Households maximize utility over the planning horizon subject to within-period budget con-
straints and the prohibition against uncollateralized borrowing. Household utility is additively
separable across the T discrete time periods. Utility in period t is a strictly concave function of
household consumption Ct (utility is U(Ct),w i t hU0 > 0 and U00 < 0). Normalize the price of
consumption to unity, and let the household time discount rate be zero.
A simple way to generate a desire for migrants to return to the home country is for consumption
overseas to yield less utility than consumption at home (as ﬁrst proposed by Hill (1987)). I make
the simplifying assumption that consumption overseas yields zero household utility: overseas work
is a pure hardship, and is done exclusively for beneﬁt of future raised consumption in the home
36Because only one person can work in the household enterprise, a household member returning from overseas
after the enterprise has been established works for domestic wage labor while the other household member works
in the enterprise. In this case, per-period household earnings will be d + rI.
37This latter condition is reasonable: most investments are likely to be lumpy in this sense. For example, if the
household wishes to provide taxi or bus services, there is a minimum cost to purchase a vehicle.
38In other words, a household may not take out a loan before starting the enterprise. Simply imagine monitoring
problems in the time between provision of the loan and actual establishment of the enterprise, during which the
household could abscond with the funds and establish the enterprise in another location (unknown to the lender).
But once the enterprise has been established (and physical assets are identiﬁable), the lender can establish a legal
right to the enterprise’s assets at the end of the last period.
23country.39 In addition to consumption on the part of the overseas worker yielding zero household
utility, overseas work by a household member also exacts a cost on the household as a whole. We
can imagine this stemming from disutility due to family separation. So let utility in periods when
am e m b e ri so v e r s e a sb em u l t i p l i e db yaf a c t o r0 <γ<1.
6.1.1 Describing the household’s decision problem
Consider distinct periods a and b,w h e r eb>a(b comes after a). Let the non-migrant’s earnings
be wa in period a, and wb in period b. Consider the choice between having the member work
overseas in either period a or period b, and domestically in the other period.
Lemma 1 Let wb ≥ wa (the income of the domestic household member either stays constant or
rises over time). If a household has the choice of supplying labor overseas in either period a or
b (but not both), utility is maximized when overseas work occurs in the earlier of the two periods
(period a).
Proof. When overseas work occurs in period b, utility is U (d + wa)+γU (f + wb).W h e n
overseas work occurs in period a, utility across the two periods is γU (f + wa)+U (d + wb).
Proof requires showing that γU (f + wa)+U (d + wb) ≥ U (d + wa)+γU (f + wb). Because of
diminishing marginal utility of consumption, because f>d , and because wb ≥ wa,i tm u s tb et r u e
that
U (d + wb) − U (d + wa) ≥ U (f + wb) − U (f + wa).
Because 0 <γ<1,i tm u s ta l s ob et r u et h a t
U (d + wb) − U (d + wa) ≥ γ (U (f + wb) − U (f + wa)).
Expanding and rearranging obtains the required condition:
γU (f + wa)+U (d + wb) ≥ U (d + wa)+γU (f + wb).
It should be clear that because entrepreneurial proﬁts are always larger than domestic wages,
a household member will never return to domestic wage labor if investment in the household
enterprise has already occurred. So the income of a domestic household member does in fact
stay constant or rise over time. This fact, combined with Lemma 1, implies that whenever the
household chooses to supply any labor overseas, it must be optimal for every period with migration
to precede every period without migration. In other words, there will be a single migration interval
starting at the ﬁrst time period, and the household migrant either returns home once or not at
all.
Let the number of periods of overseas labor supply be denoted tm,a n dl e tt h en u m b e ro fp e r i o d s
of household saving prior to investment in the enterprise be denoted ts. In other words, tm is
the last period overseas, and in period tm +1the formerly overseas member works domestically;
similarly, ts is the last period of saving, and in ts +1is the ﬁr s tp e r i o di nw h i c ht h ee n t e r p r i s e
generates proﬁts. Let the convention be that if tm =0indicates the household never supplies
labor overseas, ts =0means the household invests at the very beginning and earns proﬁts starting
39We can simply think of migrants needing some subsistence level of consumption overseas, that costs a certain
amount c. Then think of the foreign wage f as ‘disposable foreign income’, or total foreign wages net of the amount
spent for overseas subsistence, c. This allows me to simply refer to the foreign wage f from now on.
24in period 1, tm = T means the household supplies labor overseas for all periods, and ts = T means
the household never invests in the enterprise.
The household’s choice of tm and ts divides the household’s planning horizon into three in-
tervals (some of which may collapse to zero length), deﬁned as follows:40
1. The ﬁrst interval,f r o mp e r i o d1t omin[tm,t s]: one household member is overseas and one
is at home, and per-period household earnings are f + d.
2. The second interval,f r o mp e r i o dmin[tm,t s]+1to max[tm,t s], when there are two possi-
bilities for household earnings:
a) If tm >t s (return migration follows investment), per-period household earnings are
f + rI.
b) If ts >t m (investment follows return migration), per-period household earnings are 2d.
3. The third interval,f r o mp e r i o dmax[tm,t s]+1to period T: both household members are
at home, and per-period household earnings are d + rI.
In the second interval, case a), the household also has at its disposal the amount of the
collateralized enterprise loan I, which it also can either consume or save. In the third interval, it
has at its disposal any savings carried over from the second interval and any remaining amount
of the collateralized enterprise loan.
The amount invested in the enterprise is exactly the amount of savings accumulated by the
end of period ts. Because investment proﬁts rise in the investment, and uninvested savings do not
earn interest, it is never optimal to invest less than total accumulated assets once the household
decides to invest.
In general, households may choose to save from earlier periods to consume or invest in later
periods, but cannot transfer resources from later to earlier periods due to the borrowing constraint.
Now consider two periods a and b, that are each within the same deﬁned interval.
Lemma 2 Utility maximization requires consumption to be the same in any two periods that are
within the same ‘interval’.
Proof. Periods a and b are in the same interval, and so the within-period utility functions are
identical in periods a and b. Because of diminishing marginal utility of consumption, maximization
of utility therefore requires that consumption in periods a and b also be identical.
Lemma 2 suggests that a useful way to express household consumption in a particular period
within interval i is as follows. First, ‘spread’ the value of assets accumulated by the end of the
previous interval across all periods within the current interval, and add this to each period’s
earnings within the interval to create a measure of household per-period ‘resources’ within the
interval, Ri. For example, in the second period, case a), we have




where the ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand-side are household per-period earnings and the
third term is the value of the collateralized enterprise loan spread over the number of periods in
the interval.
Second, express household consumption Ci in each period within the interval as the interval’s
per-period resources Ri multiplied by one minus the savings rate within the interval, si:
Ci =( 1− si)Ri
40Let the second interval be nonexistent when tm = ts.
25So the household’s optimization problem involves deciding on a savings rate out of each pe-
riod’s resources that is the same across all periods within the same interval. It should also be
clear that savings will be zero in the third interval (s3 =0 ), because there are no subsequent
intervals after period T.
To summarize, the household’s decision problem simply involves choosing the following to
maximize household utility:
1. the number of periods of overseas work, tm,
2. the number of periods of saving for investment, ts,
3. the savings rate in the ﬁrst interval, s1,a n d
4. the savings rate in the second interval, s2.






6.1.2 Utility functions for given tm, ts, s1,a n ds2
Expressions for household utility when the choice variables take on the (not necessarily optimal)
values f tm, e ts, e s1,a n de s2 are as follows.
If the savings for investment ends before the migrant returns home (0 ≤ e ts ≤ f tm ≤ T)s ot h a t
case a) of interval 2 applies, utility is:
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where e I = e s1 [f + d] e ts.
If, on the other hand, savings for investment ends after the migrant returns home (0 ≤ f tm ≤
e ts ≤ T) so that case b) of interval 2 applies, utility is:
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6.1.3 A numerical solution
Further results rely on assuming a speciﬁc utility function and ﬁnding numerical solutions for
given parameter values. Let utility in each period j be given by the power function U (Cj)=Cα
j
(where 0 <α<1). Set the number of periods, T,a t2 0 .
The household chooses among integer values of ts and tm in the range {0,1,...,20}. In the ﬁrst
and second intervals, the household chooses savings rates s1 and s2 from a grid-space of savings
rates {0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, ..., 0.98, 0.99, 1}. 21 possible choices each of ts and tm and 101 possible
choices each of s1 and s2 yield roughly 4.5 million potential combinations of choice variables for
26a given set of parameter values. From these possible combinations, the household chooses the
combination of ts, tm , s1,a n ds2 values that maximizes household utility.
Let the model parameters take on the following values: α =0 .5, γ =0 .75, d =1 , r =0 .05,
and m =4 0 . The speciﬁc assumptions for the ﬁrst four parameters are not highly crucial and do
not make qualitative diﬀerences in the results to follow. What is key for the theoretical results
is that the minimum investment level (m) be large enough. m =4 0is a large but reasonable
minimum investment level. Assume that migrant families have a planning horizon of 5 years, so
that T =2 0implies that each period is a 0.25 years.41 With minimum investment m =4 0 ,a
household where two members each work for domestic wages of 1 unit per period will take 20
periods to accumulate the minimum investment level. A typical investment is a jeepney (small
passenger bus), that costs 400,000 pesos. In the data, median household income among households
without migrants is 36,000 pesos per half-year, or 18,000 pesos per quarter. For such a household,
an investment of 400,000 pesos is equivalent to 22.2 periods’ earnings.
The main theoretical analysis examines how household migration and investment decisions
depend on the foreign wage, f.
6.1.3.1 Three types of households As the level of the foreign wage (f) varies, it turns
out that households can be divided three distinct groups in terms of their periods overseas, their
investment decisions, and the number of periods until investment (if investing at all).
The ﬁrst type of household is one with a high level of the foreign wage, so that earnings
are high enough for entrepreneurial investment to occur at a relatively early period. In these
households, investment in the household enterprise can occur before the migrant returns from
overseas, after which migrants continue to accumulate savings that are simply intended to raise
future consumption levels. Such a household’s optimal consumption and savings over the plan-
ning horizon is illustrated in Appendix Figure 1a (for f =6 ). The dark solid line depicts the
household’s consumption level over time, while the light dotted line depicts its savings rate. In
the ﬁrst interval (periods 1 to 11) one household member works overseas while the other works for
domestic wages. Consumption and savings are therefore constant during these periods (Lemma
2). The ﬁrst shift in the consumption and savings levels occurs when the household optimally
chooses to invest its entire accumulated savings in the household enterprise at the end of period
11 (so that the enterprise ﬁrst generates proﬁts in period 12, the beginning of the second inter-
val). In the second interval the domestic household member shifts to working in the household
enterprise. The household continues to supply labor overseas, accumulating savings for future
consumption. Higher resulting domestic earnings, combined with the funds from the collateral-
ized enterprise loan allows the household to raise both its consumption and savings levels. The
third interval begins in period 15 (the last period of overseas work was period 14). Savings drops
to zero, and in each remaining period the household simply consumes its domestic earnings plus
an evenly-distributed portion of its accumulated assets.
Because the investment level (I =4 2 .35)o ft h i sﬁr s tt y p eo fh o u s e h o l di ss o m e w h a ta b o v e
the minimum investment threshold (m =4 0 ), it is apparent that these households are not bound
by the minimum investment threshold in making their investment decisions. So this ﬁr s tt y p eo f
household is termed an unconstrained investor.
A second group of households has a somewhat lower level of the foreign wage; an example of
such a household is depicted in Appendix Figure 1b (for f =3 .5). For such households, there is
only a ﬁrst interval (a period of overseas work and savings) and a third interval (where enterprise
investment has occurred and the overseas worker has returned home); investment in the household
41This is reasonable, as stays overseas tend to be fairly short. 84% of migrants away in June 1997 had been
overseas for less than 4 years.
27enterprise and the return of the overseas worker are simultaneous (both occurring at the end of
period 12), so that the second interval is nonexistent. In this example, household invested capital
is 40.5, only slightly higher than the minimum investment threshold.42 If there had been no
minimum investment threshold (or if it had been somewhat lower), the household would have
preferred to invest a lower amount, and would have ceased supplying labor overseas earlier. But
the requirement to invest at least m leads the household to supply labor overseas only until it
has saved the minimum investment threshold, after which migrants return immediately and the
household simultaneously invests. Because these households supply labor overseas only until they
have achieved the investment threshold, these households are termed target-earners (as in Piore
(1979)).
A third group of households has the lowest level of the foreign wage, and an example of such a
household is in Appendix Figure 1c (for f =2 ). These households would take relatively long (and
too many periods overseas) to achieve the minimum investment level, allowing too few periods at
the end to enjoy the returns from the investment. So they choose not to invest in an enterprise
at all. The household simply supplies labor overseas to save for future consumption in the ﬁrst
interval (until the end of period 3 in this example), and each subsequent period it consumes two
members’ domestic wages plus a portion of accumulated savings from the ﬁrst interval. I simply
term this group of households non-investors.
An alternative view of the three groups of households (for a range of values of the foreign
wage f) is provided by Appendix Figure 2.43 The ﬁgure depicts optimal periods overseas t∗
m (the
solid line) and optimal periods prior to enterprise investment t∗
s (the dotted line), for a range
of values of the foreign wage. Up to a value of f slightly less than 2, households prefer not to
supply labor overseas at all (the foreign wage is too low; recall the domestic wage d is 1). At
higher foreign wages, optimal periods overseas rise in the foreign wage (until f is slightly above
3). These households reach the last period without having invested (t∗
s =2 0 ) indicating they are
non-investors.
Continuing to higher foreign wages, the solid line dips downward and ﬂattens out for a range
(up to between 4 and 5). For these households, return from overseas is simultaneous with enter-
prise investment (the solid and dotted lines coincide), identifying them as target-earners.
At even higher foreign wages, the solid line rises, while the dotted line falls. These households
are investing prior to return migration; these households are unconstrained investors.
6.1.3.2 Impact of exchange rate shock The empirical analysis examines the impact of
exchange rate shocks on return migration and on investment decisions in migrants’ source house-
holds, so here it is useful to examine the theoretical impact of such shocks. The model predicts
that the impact of such shocks varies according to a household’s foreign wage, and will contrast
starkly with the predictions made by a model with relaxed borrowing constraints.
What exactly is an exchange rate shock in this setting? Denote a household’s accumulated
savings from foreign earnings at the start of any period j (assumed to be held overseas until
42Raising the ﬁne-ness of the numerical simulation’s grid-spaces can bring the investment level for such a
household arbitrarily close to 40.
43To produce this and all subsequent graphs in the Theory Appendix, utility-maximizing values of the choice
variables were found for each discrete value of f in the grid-space [1, 1.125, 1.25, 1.375, ..., 7.75, 7.875,8].T h e
range of foreign wages considered is reasonable. For example, domestic servants in Manila typically earn no more
than 2,500 per month. By contrast, an anecdotal sampling of typical salaries for domestic servants in foreign
countries reported by one Manila recruitment agency range from 10,000 pesos per month in Singapore, Malaysia,
and the United Arab Emirates, to 23,400 pesos per month in Hong Kong (a range of 4 to more than 10 times the
corresponding Philippine wage.) (Figures acquired in a personal visit by the author in the summer of 2002. At
that time, the Philippine peso was trading at roughly 50 pesos to the US dollar.)
28the migrant’s return) as Aj. Let all monetary variables (f, d, m, I,a n dAj) be denominated
in households’ domestic currency. Now let f and Aj be the exchange rate E (units of domestic
currency that can be purchased with every unit of foreign currency) multiplied by these variables
denominated in foreign currency (e f and f Aj respectively):
f = E e f
Aj = Ef Aj
An exchange rate shock is simply a change in the exchange rate (∆E). As such, it changes
the domestic currency value of both the foreign wage and any accumulated savings from foreign
earnings. Assume exchange rate shocks are permanent changes in the exchange rate, and are
k n o w nt ob es ob yh o u s e h o l d s .
What assets are held overseas? Assume that when households save, they draw equally across
all income sources (foreign wages, domestic wages, and the current period’s planned drawdown
of the collateralized enterprise loan). Let savings from domestic sources (domestic wages and the
collateralized enterprise loan) be held domestically, while foreign savings are held overseas until
the migrant returns home.
To examine the impact of an exchange rate shock, the exact timing of events needs to be
speciﬁed. Consider a given period j, when a household starts with a member working overseas.
Let the order of events within period j be as follows:
1. The household observes the exchange rate shock (if any).
2. The household supplies labor in the previously-planned locations (one overseas, one do-
mestic). (Locations of labor supply may not be modiﬁed within the same period as an exchange
rate shock.)
3. The household saves and consumes. (The savings rate may be modiﬁed in response to the
exchange rate shock.)
4. The household decides where the overseas member will work (overseas or domestically) for
period j +1 .
5. If the household has not yet established a household enterprise, the household decides
whether or not to establish it (invest), so that proﬁt sc a nb ee a r n e di np e r i o dj +1and after. If
so, all accumulated savings overseas (Aj) are transferred to the home country and invested (in
combination with domestic savings).
6. The household takes out the collateralized enterprise loan.
7. Period j +1begins.
Consider subjecting a subset of households to an exchange rate shock amounting to a 50%
increase in the exchange rate (∆E
E =0 .5). How does this change overseas workers’ return decisions?
Because the exchange rate shock should aﬀect households diﬀerently depending on their elapsed
number of periods, some assumption regarding the distribution of households across periods is
necessary; simply assume that households are uniformly distributed across periods (within each
foreign wage level).
First consider households that experience no change in their exchange rate. The solid line
in Appendix Figure 3a represents their 1-period return rate: the fraction of households with a
member overseas at the start of a given period j whose migrant returns home at the end of that
period. Because households are assumed uniformly distributed across periods, this return rate
is simply 1
t∗
m, the inverse of the optimal number of periods overseas. The return rate is positive
for all values of the foreign wage, and naturally is a mirror image of the solid line in Appendix
Figure 2: ﬁrst falling, moving slightly upwards to a temporary plateau, and then falling again in
the foreign wage.
29T h ed o t t e dl i n ei nt h eﬁgure is the 1-period return rate for households that do experience an
exchange rate shock, and it is starkly diﬀerent from the solid line. Only migrants with intermediate
values of the foreign wage return at all at the end of the shock period, and their return rates
are substantially higher than those in households without a shock. For all other households, the
return rate is zero.
Appendix Figure 3b displays the diﬀerence between the return rates of the unshocked and
shocked households (the shocked return rate minus the unshocked return rate, for each value of
the foreign wage). For households with the lowest and highest values of the foreign wage, the
1-period return rate is lower for shocked vs. unshocked households. By contrast, for households
with intermediate values of the foreign wage, the return rate for shocked households is either
higher than or the same as the return rate for unshocked households.
The exchange rate shock apparently has opposite eﬀects on return rates for two groups of
households: on the one hand, households with intermediate foreign wages, and, on the other,
households with either the lowest or highest foreign wages. The explanation becomes clearer
when we also examine the impact of the exchange rate shock on household investment.
Deﬁne the ‘1-period investment rate’ as the fraction of households with a migrant overseas
who make an enterprise investment at the end of the period of the exchange rate shock (so that
an enterprise begins generating proﬁts in the subsequent period).44 Appendix Figure 4a depicts
the 1-period investment rate for households without (the solid line) and with (the dotted line) an
exchange rate shock, and Appendix Figure 4b shows the diﬀerence in the investment rate between
shocked and unshocked households.45
In households with the lowest foreign wages, the investment rate is zero for both shocked and
unshocked households. These are households who in the unshocked case are ‘non-investors’. When
experiencing an exchange rate shock, households in this group either remain non-investors (but
are encouraged by the higher foreign wages to extend their overseas stays), or decide to become
target-earners (and must stay overseas for longer to save for investment). So no migrants from
these households return at the end of the period (the return rate goes to zero). The exchange
rate shock also has no eﬀect on investment at the end of the period, either: households are either
still non-investors, or, if they have decided to be target-earners, they must accumulate assets for
somewhat longer before investing.
Households with intermediate foreign wages have the highest increase in the investment rate.
These households are target-earners, who remain overseas only until they have saved at least the
minimum investment threshold m. The exchange rate shock, by raising (in domestic currency
terms) both the current period’s foreign wage and the accumulated overseas savings, suddenly
allows some fraction of these households to exceed the minimum investment threshold in the
current period. Thus an exchange rate shock leads to the largest increase in both the return rate
and the investment rate for these households.
Households with the highest foreign wages were unconstrained investors prior to the shock.
Their return rate falls as they decide on the margin to extend their overseas stays to take advantage
of higher foreign wages. The investment rate rises because of the windfall increase in assets, but
not by as much as the increase for households with intermediate foreign wages: some fraction of
unconstrained investors had already invested prior to the shock, and so could not invest again;
by contrast, all the target-earners were postponing investment until return, and so all had the
44I restrict attention to households with migrants overseas because the exchange rate shock has no impact on
households not supplying labor overseas.
45The jaggedness of the dotted line derives from the discreteness of the grid-spaces used in the numerical
simulation, particularly the restriction that households choose among integer values for tm and ts. Substantially
ﬁner grid-spaces would eliminate these jags.
30option to invest sooner in response to the shock.
6.1.3.3 Relaxing the credit constraint To illustrate the importance of the prohibition on
non-collateralized borrowing in generating the theoretical results so far, it is useful to consider
the impact of an exchange rate shock in a situation where this borrowing constraint is relaxed
somewhat. The non-collateralized borrowing constraint was justiﬁed earlier by supposing that
lenders could not prevent households from absconding with loans before the funds were invested
in the enterprise. Now, instead assume that lenders are able to prevent such default.
This allows households to borrow and invest in an enterprise at very beginning, so that one
household member earns enterprise proﬁts of rI (instead of the domestic wage d)i na l lp e r i o d s .
(The other member’s options remain overseas work at wage f, or domestic work at wage d.)
Without formally modeling the credit market, the ceiling on how much a given household can
borrow is arbitrary. Assume simply that a household’s credit ceiling is the amount they would
have invested at the original (pre-shock) exchange rate when non-collateralized borrowing was
prohibited (analyzed in the previous subsections), with the exception that non-investors (who
would have invested zero) are allowed to borrow the minimum investment threshold, m.R e t a i n
the assumption that the rate of interest and the rate of depreciation of invested capital are zero,
so again repayment of the loan simply means turning the enterprise over to the lender at the end
of the last period. Assume that at the minimum credit ceiling per-period enterprise proﬁts exceed
the domestic wage, so that all households then borrow and invest their credit ceiling at the very
beginning.
Maintaining all other assumptions from the previous subsections, Appendix Figures 5a, 5b and
5c illustrate optimal choices for households allowed such non-collateralized borrowing. Appendix
Figure 5a shows that the optimal number of periods overseas rises continuously in the foreign
wage. There are no target-earners to generate kinks in this curve, unlike in the case depicted in
Appendix Figure 2. (Because all households invest at the very beginning, Appendix Figure 5a
shows no curve for optimal periods prior to investment. For the same reason, the investment rate
is not meaningful.)
Appendix Figure 5b depicts the 1-period return rate for households that do (dotted line) and
do not (solid line) experience an exchange rate shock. The return rate of unshocked households
declines continuously in the foreign wage. For shocked households, the return rate in the period of
the shock is zero for households below a certain foreign wage (around 4.5); such households have
reoptimized and extended their desired periods of overseas work, and so none return right after
the shock. For shocked households with higher foreign wages, the 1-period return rate coincides
with the rate for unshocked households. The fact that periods overseas is unchanged for these
households reﬂects the fact that households with higher wages have on average accumulated more
overseas savings at any point in time, and so experience a larger increase in wealth when the
exchange rate shock occurs. An increase in wealth raises the desirability of return migration (an
income eﬀect), which for these households is large enough to oﬀset the substitution eﬀect of the
increase in foreign wages. On net, then, the return rate is unchanged for these households.46
All told, then, the change in the 1-period return rate due to the shock declines in the foreign
wage (Appendix Figure 5c) in a model with a relaxed borrowing constraint.
46In the model with the non-collateralized borrowing constraint, the wealth increase is in general not large
enough to oﬀset the substitution eﬀect of the increase in foreign earnings because high-foreign-wage households
hold less in overseas savings on average (many have already invested, and so a large fraction of their assets have
been transferred to home country and are not aﬀe c t e db yt h ee x c h a n g er a t es h o c k ) .
316.2 Data Appendix
6.2.1 Data sets
Four linked household surveys were provided by the National Statistics Oﬃce of the Philippine
government: the Labor Force Survey (LFS), the Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF), the Family
Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), and the Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS).
The Labor Force Survey (LFS) collects data on primary activity and demographic charac-
teristics of household members aged 10 or above. These data refer to the household members’
activities in the week prior to the survey. The survey deﬁnes a household as a group of people who
live under the same roof and share common food. The deﬁnition also includes people currently
overseas if they lived with the household before departure. The Survey on Overseas Filipinos
(SOF) is administered in October of each year to households reporting in the LFS that any mem-
bers left for overseas within the last ﬁve years. The SOF collects information on characteristics
of the household’s overseas members, their overseas locations and lengths of stay overseas, and
the value of remittances received by the household from overseas in the last six months (April to
September).
In the analysis, I use the July 1997 and October 1998 rounds of the LFS and the October 1997
and October 1998 rounds of the SOF. Because 1997 remittances in the SOF refer to an April-
September reporting period, the SOF remittance data cannot be used to determine a household’s
level of remittances prior to the July 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis. So I obtain initial (Jan-Jun
1997) remittance receipts from the July 1997 round of the Family Income and Expenditure Survey
(FIES).
Data on total household income, real property purchases and entrepreneurial income are avail-
able for the pre-crisis period (Jan-Jun 1997) from the July 1997 FIES. Data on real property
purchases, entrepreneurial income, and vehicle ownership are available for the post-crisis period
(Apr-Sep 1998) from the October 1998 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS). Unfortunately,
data on vehicle ownership in the pre-crisis period are unavailable in the July 1997 round of the
FIES; these data were only recorded in the January 1998 survey. So analyses of changes in vehicle
ownership examine changes from January 1998 (from the FIES) to October 1998 (from the APIS).
Monthly exchange rate data (used in construct i n gt h ee x c h a n g er a t es h o c kv a r i a b l e )w e r e
obtained from Bloomberg L.P.
The sample used in the empirical analysis consists of all households meeting the following
criteria:
1. The household is inferred to have one or more members working overseas in June 1997.
Using the October 1997 SOF, I identify households that had one or more members working
overseas in June 1997, and identify the locations of these overseas members. (See the next
subsection for the exact procedure.)
2. The household’s dwelling was also included in the October 1998 LFS/SOF. As mentioned
above, one-quarter of households in the sample in July 1997 had just been rotated out of
the sample in October 1998.
3. The same household has occupied the dwelling between July 1997 and October 1998. This
criterion is necessary because the Labor Force Survey does not attempt to interview house-
holds that have changed dwellings. Usefully, the LFS dataset contains a ﬁeld noting whether
the household currently living in the dwelling is the same as the household surveyed in the
previous round.
324. The household has complete data on pre-crisis control and outcome variables (recorded July
1997).
5. The household has complete data on post-crisis outcome variables (recorded October 1998).
Of 30,744 dwellings that the National Statistics Oﬃce did not rotate out of the sample be-
tween July 1997 and October 1998 (criterion 2), 28,152 (91.6%) contained the same household
continuously over that period (criterion 3). Of these households, 27,715 (98.4%) had complete
data for all variables used in the analysis (criteria 4 and 5). And of these 27,715, 1,614 (5.8%)
had a member overseas in June 1997 (criterion 1). These 1,614 households are the sample used
in the empirical analysis.
Constructing the sample on the basis of Criteria 1, 2, and 4 does not threaten the validity of
the empirical estimate of the impact of the migrant economic shocks on households. Criteria 1
and 4 are based on pre-shock characteristics of the surveyed households, and criterion 2 comes
from the predetermined rotation schedule established by the National Statistics Oﬃce.
It is important to check whether sample selection on the basis of Criteria 3 or 5 may have
been aﬀected by the independent variable of interest (shocks experienced by migrant members)
because household propensities to change dwellings or to misreport information in the survey
may have been aﬀected by the shocks. Attrition from the household sample due to these criteria
should not generate biased coeﬃcient estimates if such attrition is uncorrelated with the shocks.
Yang (2004), which uses essentially the same sample for analysis, ﬁnds no evidence that attrition
due to Criteria 3 or 5 is associated with the exchange rate shocks, and so allowing these criteria
play a role in determining the sample for analysis should not threaten the internal validity of the
estimates.
6.2.2 Determining locations of overseas household members
The main outcome variable in the empirical analysis is the 12-month migrant return rate: the
number of household migrant workers who returned between July 1997 and June 1998 divided by
the number of household members working overseas in June 1997. In this subsection I describe
the rules used to determine if a particular individual in the October 1997 Survey on Overseas
Filipinos was overseas in June 1997, and if so, what country the person was in. Among other
questions, the SOF asks:
1. When did the family member last leave for overseas?
2. In what country did the family member intend to stay when he/she last left?
3. When did the family member return home from his/her last departure (if at all)?
These questions unambiguously identify individuals as being away in June 1997 (and their
overseas locations) if they left for overseas in or before that month, and returned afterwards (or
have not yet returned). Unfortunately, the survey does not collect information on stays overseas
prior to the most recent one. So there are individuals who most recently left for overseas between
June 1997 and the survey date in October 1997, but who were likely to have been overseas before
then as well. Fortunately, there is an additional question in the SOF that is of use:
4. How many months has the family member worked/been working abroad during the last
ﬁve years?
Using this question, two reasonable assumptions allow me to proceed. First, assume all stays
overseas are continuous (except for vacations home in the midst of a stay overseas). Second,
assume no household member moves between countries overseas. When making these two as-
sumptions, the questions asked on the SOF are suﬃcient to identify whether a household had a
member in a particular country in June 1997.
33For example, a household surveyed in October 1997 might have a household member who
last left for Saudi Arabia in July 1997 and had not yet returned from that stay overseas. If
that household member is reported as having worked overseas for 4 months or more, the ﬁrst
assumption implies the person ﬁrst left for overseas in or before June 1997. The second assumption
implies that the person was in Saudi Arabia.
89.8% of individuals identiﬁed as being away in June 1997 (and their overseas locations) were
classiﬁed as such using just questions 1 to 3 above. The remaining 10.2% of individuals identiﬁed
as being away in June 1997 (and their locations) relied on question 4 above and the two allocation
assumptions just described.
6.3 Empirical Appendix
It is important to investigate whether the empirical results may be biased by pre-existing dif-
ferences in migrant return rates across households whose migrants are in diﬀerent countries (as
discussed in subsection 4.3). The test described here involves checking whether migrant return
rates prior to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis are correlated with the (future) exchange rate shocks that
were to occur in their overseas location countries after July 1997. In years leading up to 1997,
it is not possible to track households between successive waves of the annual Survey of Overseas
Filipinos (SOF), because the Labor Force Survey (within which the SOF is adminstered) followed
a faster household rotation schedule prior to July 1997. Therefore, it is not possible to calculate
migrant return rates as in the main analysis above (the number of migrants who returned between
July of year t and June of year t +1 , divided by the number of migrants who were overseas in
June of year t).
However, one can use the cross-sectional SOF to carry out an (admittedly imperfect) analysis
of return rates, in the following manner. It is possible to construct migrant return rates using
retrospective questions on migrants’ previous departures and returns from variables that are
included in the cross-sectional SOF. Migrant return rates constructed in this way are imperfect,
because the questions in the SOF in some cases do not allow a migrant’s past location to be
known with certainty, especially for time periods more than a few months in the past.
T om a k et h et e s tc o m p a r a b l et ot h a ti nt h em a i na n a l y s i sa b o v e ,t h el o c a t i o n so fi n d i v i d u a l
migrants’ observed in, say, the October 1997 SOF must be inferred for June 1996. An indicator
variable is then constructed that takes the value of 1 if the migrant returned over the subsequent
12-month period, and 0 otherwise. The procedure is identical to that described in Data Appen-
dix subsection 6.2.2. The unit of observation is the migrant (rather than the household), and
regressions analogous to equations (3) and (4) are estimated.
The approach of using the retrospective questions in the cross-sectional SOF to construct a
return indicator has some other drawbacks. Initial (pre-return) characteristics of migrants and
their origin households are not known, only the characteristics at the time of the October SOF. So
only variables that can be considered relatively ‘immutable’ are used as right-hand side controls.47
In addition, with this approach it is impossible to examine changes in variables associated with
household investment, which require household panel data.
47These variables are: indicators for migrant’s months away as of June of previous year (12-23, 24-35, 36-47,
48 or more; 0-11 omitted); indicators for migrant’s highest education level completed (high school, some college,
college or more; less than high school omitted); relationship to HH head (female head or spouse of head, daughter,
son, other relation; male head omitted); years of age; indicator for location in ‘immigration destination’; log of 1996
per capita income in migrant’s location country; ﬁve indicators for household head’s highest level of education
completed (elementary, some high school, high school, some college, and college or more; less than elementary
omitted).
34Appendix Table 4 presents regression results. First, Panel A shows that this alternative
approach does generate the negative eﬀect of the exchange rate shock on migrant returns in the
post-crisis period (July 1997-June 1998). In the ﬁrst column, no independent variables other than
the exchange rate shock are included in the regression, while the second column includes controls
for migrant and household characteristics. Both coeﬃcients are negative, roughly the same size,
and are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The coeﬃcients are slightly larger than
those in the corresponding columns (1 and 2) of Table 5, but remain well within 95% conﬁdence
intervals.
Panel B reports analogous regression results, but where instead the outcome variable is an
indicator for migrant return in the 12 months up to June 1997 . In each regression the coeﬃcients
are smaller in magnitude, and in neither are the coeﬃcients statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Both coeﬃcients are only one-quarter the size (around -0.05) of the coeﬃcients in Panel
A. In sum, this analysis provides no evidence that pre-existing variation in migrant return rates
correlated with future exchange rate shocks is a likely source of bias in the regression estimates
of Table 4.
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37Table 1: Types of migrants generated by theoretical model
Migrant types
Target-earner
Migrant characteristics Unconstrained investor Non-investor
Level of foreign wage High Low Intermediate
Timing of investment Before return 
migration
(No investment) Simultaneous with 
return migration
How accumulated savings are used 
upon return
Consumption Consumption Investment
Effect of positive exchange rate 
shock on return migration
Negative* Negative* Positive
* Assuming substitution effect dominates income effect









Saudi Arabia 521 29.1% 0.40
Hong Kong, China 210 11.7% 0.40
Taiwan 148 8.3% 0.22
Singapore 124 6.9% 0.24
Japan 116 6.5% 0.27
United States 116 6.5% 0.40
Malaysia 65 3.6% -0.01
Italy 52 2.9% 0.27
Kuwait 51 2.8% 0.38
United Arab Emirates 49 2.7% 0.40
Greece 44 2.5% 0.21
Korea, Rep. 36 2.0% -0.02
Northern Mariana Islands 30 1.7% 0.40
Canada 29 1.6% 0.35
Brunei 22 1.2% 0.24
United Kingdom 15 0.8% 0.42
Norway 14 0.8% 0.25
Australia 14 0.8% 0.21
Bahrain 13 0.7% 0.40
Indonesia 10 0.6% -0.39
Other 114 6.4%
Total 1,793 100.0%
NOTES -- Data are from Oct 1997 Survey on Overseas Filipinos. "Other" 
includes 31 additional countries. Overseas workers in table are those in 
households included in sample for empirical analysis (see Data Appendix for 
details on sample definition). Exchange rate shock: Change in Philippine pesos 
per currency unit where overseas worker was located in Jun 1997. Change is 
average of 12 months leading to Jun 1998 minus average of 12 months leading 
to Jun 1997, divided by the latter (e.g., 10% increase is 0.1).
returnmig_tables  summstats_ows_locationsTable 3 Characteristics of overseas workers from sample households
Mean Std. Dev. 10th pctile Median 90th pctile
Age 34.44 8.95 24.00 33.00 47.00
Marital status is single (indicator) 0.38
Gender is male (indicator) 0.53
Occupation (indicators)
Production and related workers 0.31
Domestic servants 0.31
Ship's officers and crew 0.12
Professional and technical workers 0.11
Clerical and related workers 0.04
Other services 0.10
Other 0.01
Highest education level (indicators)
Less than high school 0.15
High school 0.24
Some college 0.31
College or more 0.30
Position in household (indicators)
Male head of household 0.28
Female head or spouse of head 0.12
Daughter of head 0.28
Son of head 0.15
Other relation to head 0.16





48 months or more 0.16
Per capita income in location country (US$) 16,955 10,769 6,935 15,132 28,341
12-month migrant return rate in location, 1996-97 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.15
Immigration destination (indicator) 0.19
Number of individuals: 
1,793
NOTE -- Data source is October 1997 Survey on Overseas Filipinos, National Statistics Office of the Philippines. "Other" 
occupational category includes "administrative, executive, and managerial workers" and "agricultural workers". Overseas 
workers in table are those in households included in sample for empirical analysis (see Data Appendix for details on sample 
definition). "Per capita income in location country" is in 1996 (Source: World Development Indicators 2002, in 1995 US$). 
"12-month migrant return rate in location, 1996-97" is fraction of migrants away in July 1996 in the migrant's overseas location 
who returned home by June 1997. "Immigration destination" is a country where permanent immigration by Filipinos is 
common: Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, United States (including Pacific trust territories), Canada, and Australia.
returnmig_tables  summstats_owsTable 4 Summary statistics for sample households
Num. of obs.: 1,614
Mean Std. Dev. 10th pctile Median 90th pctile
Exchange rate shock 0.32 0.13 0.21 0.40 0.40
12-month migrant return rate 0.08 0.27
Household financial statistics (Jan-Jun 1997)
Total expenditures 73,400 66,701 24,507 57,496 132,600
Total income 94,051 93,313 27,917 70,389 174,526
Income per capita in household 20,153 21,492 5,504 15,197 39,076
Cash receipts from overseas 35,950 47,004 0 25,000 86,000
Cash receipts from overseas (as share of hh income) 0.39 0.31 0.00 0.37 0.85
Real property purchases (as share of hh income) 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of HH members working overseas in Jun 1997 1.11 0.37 1.00 1.00 1.00
HH size (including overseas members, Jul 1997) 6.17 2.42 3 6 9
Located in urban area 0.68
Owns a vehicle (indicator) 0.13
HH position in national income per capita distribution, 





HH income sources (Jan-Jun 1997)
Entrepreneurial income, as share of total 0.17 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.58
Indicator: nonzero entrepreneurial income 0.50
Household head characteristics (Jul 1997):
Age 50.0 13.9 32 50 68
Highest education level (indicators)
Less than elementary 0.17
Elementary 0.20
Some high school 0.10
High school 0.22
Some college 0.16








Does not work 0.00
Marital status is single (indicator) 0.03
NOTES -- Data source: National Statistics Office, the Philippines. Surveys used: Labor Force Survey (Jul 1997 and Oct 1998), 
Survey on Overseas Filipinos (Oct 1997 and Oct 1998), 1997 Family Income and Expenditures Survey (for Jan-Jun 1997 income and 
expenditures), and 1998 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (for Apr-Sep 1998 income and expenditures). Currency unit: Expenditure, 
income, and cash receipts from abroad are in Philippine pesos (26 per US$ in Jan-Jun 1997). 
Sample definition: Households with a member working overseas in Jun 1996 (according to Oct 1997 Survey of Overseas Filipinos) 
and that also appear in 1998 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey, and excluding households with incomplete data (see Data Appendix 
for details).  Variable definitions: "Exchange rate shock" is change in Philippine pesos per currency unit where overseas worker was 
located in Jun 1997. Change is average of 12 months leading to Jun 1998 minus average of 12 months leading to Jun 1997, divided 
by the latter (e.g., 10% increase is 0.1). If household has more than one overseas worker in Jun 1997, exchange rate shock variable is 
average change in exchange rate across household's overseas workers. "Migrant return rate" is number of household's migrant 
workers who returned between Jul 1997 and Jun 1998 divided by number of household members working overseas in Jun 1997. 
"Owns a vehicle" indicator is as of Jan 1998.
 returnmig_tables  summstats_hhTable 5 Impact of exchange rate shock on return migration and new departures, 1997 - 1998
Dependent variable: 12-month migrant return rate (Jul 97 to Jun 98)
Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exchange rate shock -0.156 -0.155 -0.154 -0.141
(0.071)** (0.058)*** (0.059)** (0.061)**
12-month migrant return rate in location, 1996-97 0.041 0.037
(0.128) (0.122)
Migrant job loss in 1998 (indicator) 0.154
(0.051)***
Other included independent variables:
Region indicators, Region*Urban -YYY
Controls for pre-crisis household and -YYY
     migrant characteristics
R-squared 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.09
Num. of obs. in all columns: 1,614
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Each column is a separate OLS regression. Unit of observation is a household. Standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered by location country of household's eldest overseas worker. See Table 4 for notes on sample definition and 
definitions of exchange rate shock and migrant return rate. "12-month migrant return rate in location, 1996-97" is 
fraction of migrants away in July 1996 in the migrant's overseas location who returned home by June 1997. "Migrant job 
loss in 1998" is an indicator for household reporting (in October 1998) that a migrant member suffered a job loss in the 
past year (8% of households report such a loss).
Region indicators are for 16 regions within the country. Region*Urban variables are region indicators interacted with an 
indicator for urban location. Household-level controls are as follows. Income variables as reported in Jan-Jun 1997: log 
of per capita household income; indicators for being in 2nd, 3rd, and top quartile of sample distribution of household per 
capita income. Demographic and occupational variables as reported in July 1997: number of household members 
(including overseas members); five indicators for head's highest level of education completed (elementary, some high 
school, high school, some college, and college or more; less than elementary omitted); head's age; indicator for "head's 
marital status is single"; six indicators for head's occupation (professional, clerical, service, production, other, not 
working; agricultural omitted).
Migrant controls are means of the following variables across HH's overseas workers away in June 1997: indicators for 
months away (12-23, 24-35, 36-47, 48 or more; 0-11 omitted); indicators for highest education level completed (high 
school, some college, college or more; less than high school omitted); occupation indicators (domestic servant, ship's 
officer or crew, professional, clerical, other service, other occupation; production omitted); relationship to HH head 
(female head or spouse of head, daughter, son, other relation; male head omitted); indicator for single marital status; 
years of age; indicator for location in "immigration destination" (see note to Table 3 for list of countries); log of 1996 per 
capita GDP in migrant's location country (1995 US$).
returnmig_tables  returnTable 6 Heterogeneity in impact of exchange rate shock on return migration and household investment, 1997 - 1998
Dependent variable: 12-month migrant 
return rate
Change in vehicle 
ownership









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(E. R. shock) * (Low foreign wage index) -0.179 0.086 0.011 -0.090 -0.027
(0.105)* (0.209) (0.077) (0.214) (0.642)
(E. R. shock) * (Intermediate foreign wage index) 0.011 0.340 0.112 0.118 0.934
(0.13) (0.161)** (0.088) (0.101) (0.365)**
(E. R. shock) * (High foreign wage index) -0.412 0.048 -0.101 -0.017 -0.135
(0.14)*** (0.217) (0.122) (0.133) (0.614)
(Migrant job loss) * (Low foreign wage index) 0.098 0.073 -0.005 -0.098 -0.091
(0.102) (0.093) (0.012) (0.068) (0.165)
(Migrant job loss) * (Intermediate foreign wage index) 0.219 0.056 -0.003 -0.018 0.044
(0.108)** (0.058) (0.016) (0.06) (0.144)
(Migrant job loss) * (High foreign wage index) 0.141 0.009 -0.023 0.117 0.202
(0.071)** (0.052) (0.02) (0.051)** (0.139)
Intermediate foreign wage index -0.084 -0.082 -0.013 -0.060 -0.262
(0.061) (0.099) (0.04) (0.077) (0.259)
High foreign wage index 0.028 -0.008 0.064 -0.033 0.033
(0.059) (0.112) (0.054) (0.1) (0.315)
Other included independent variables:
Region indicators, Region*Urban Y YYYY
Controls for pre-crisis household and Y YYYY
     migrant characteristics
Num. of obs. 1614 1614 1614 1614 1614
R-squared 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.07
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Each column displays coefficients (standard errors) from an OLS regression where dependent variable is 1997-98 migrant return rate. Due to generated regressor, 
standard errors are bootstrapped with migrant location countries as clusters. Unit of observation is a household. See Appendix Table 3 for auxiliary regression used to create 
foreign wage index (predicted remittances). "Low foreign wage index" is indicator for below 30th percentile of foreign wage index, while "intermediate" and "high" are 
indicators for 30th-70th percentile and above 70th percentile of foreign wage index, respectively. See notes to Tables 4 and 5 for definitions of exchange rate shock and 
right-hand-side variables. Changes in entrepreneurial income and in real property purchases are between Jan-Jun 1997 and Apr-Sep 1998 reporting periods, and are 
expressed as fractions of initial (Jan-Jun 1997) household income. "Change in vehicle ownership" is change in an indicator for ownership of any vehicles from Jan 1998 to 
Oct 1998 (takes on values of -1, 0, and 1).
returnmig_tables  heteffectAppendix Table 1: Determinants of exchange rate shock (July 1997 to June 1998)
   (Coefficients from OLS regression)
Dependent variable: Exchange rate shock (Jul 97 to Jun 98)
Migrant characteristics Household characteristics
Return rate in location, 1996-1997 -0.118 Head has elementary education 0.016
(0.209) (0.008)*
Away 12-23 months 0.011 Head has some high school education 0.016
(0.009) (0.015)
Away 24-35 months 0.022 Head has high school education 0.03
(0.008)*** (0.011)***
Away 36-47 months 0.021 Head has some post-secondary education 0.032
(0.008)** (0.019)
Away 48 months or more 0.022 Head has college education or more 0.036
(0.013) (0.021)
Female head or spouse of head -0.019 Log (per capita income in hh) -0.002
(0.024) (0.010)
Daughter of head -0.006 2nd quartile of sample pc income 0.023
(0.025) (0.012)*
Son of head 0.001 3rd quartile of sample pc income 0.007
(0.015) (0.013)
Other relation to head 0.002 Top quartile of sample pc income -0.004
(0.016) (0.017)
Has high school education -0.008 Head is professional 0.003
(0.010) (0.011)
Has some post-secondary education -0.025 Head is clerical 0.002
(0.017) (0.009)
Has college education or more -0.012 Head is service worker -0.011
(0.017) (0.018)
Age 0.001 Head is production worker -0.005
(0.001) (0.008)
Marital status is single 0.006 Head has other occupation 0.001
(0.009) (0.008)
Immigration destination 0.007 Head does not work 0.05
(0.052) (0.041)
Per capita income in location 0.024 Head's age 0
(0.041) 0.000
Domestic servant 0.022 Head has single marital status 0.012
(0.034) (0.011)




Clerical 0.028 Region indicators, Region*Urban Y
(0.029)
Other service occupation 0.011
(0.015)
Other occupation -0.052
(0.035) Num. of obs. 1614
R-squared 0.11
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Table displays coefficients (standard errors) from a single OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered 
by location country. Unit of observation is a household. Other included independent variables are region indicators and 
region*urban interactions (coefficients not shown). All independent variables are recorded in July 1997 or before. See notes to 
Tables 3 and 4 for definitions of exchange rate shock and right-hand-side variables. Omitted indicator variables are: migrant 
away 0-11 months, migrant is male head of household, migrant has less than high school education, migrant is production 
worker, household head has less than elementary education, household is in 1st quartile of sample per capita income, household 
head is agricultural worker.
returnmig_tables  pred_ershockAppendix Table 2: Determinants of migrant returns, July 1997 - June 1998
   (Coefficients from OLS regression)
Dependent variable: 12-month migrant return rate (Jul 97 to Jun 98)
Exchange rate shock -0.141
(0.061)**
Return rate in location, 1996-1997 0.037
(0.122)
Migrant job loss in 1998 0.154
(0.051)***
Migrant characteristics Household characteristics
Away 12-23 months 0.033 Head has elementary education -0.019
(0.012)*** (0.015)
Away 24-35 months -0.004 Head has some high school education -0.006
(0.017) (0.017)
Away 36-47 months 0.035 Head has high school education -0.013
(0.017)** (0.020)
Away 48 months or more 0.045 Head has some post-secondary education -0.048
(0.018)** (0.019)**
Female head or spouse of head -0.027 Head has college education or more -0.038
(0.022) (0.020)*
Daughter of head -0.04 Log (per capita income in hh) -0.012
(0.033) (0.019)
Son of head -0.046 2nd quartile of sample pc income 0.014
(0.034) (0.026)
Other relation to head -0.064 3rd quartile of sample pc income 0.051
(0.027)** (0.034)
Has high school education 0.035 Top quartile of sample pc income 0.037
(0.020)* (0.039)
Has some post-secondary education 0.015 Head is professional 0.047
(0.018) (0.029)
Has college education or more 0.019 Head is clerical 0.057
(0.019) (0.021)***
Age 0 Head is service worker -0.012
(0.001) (0.034)
Marital status is single 0.002 Head is production worker 0.011
(0.014) (0.024)
Immigration destination -0.05 Head has other occupation 0.011
(0.019)*** (0.018)
Log (per capita GDP) in location 0.005 Head does not work 0.164
(0.013) (0.080)**
Domestic servant -0.025 Head's age 0
(0.017) (0.001)
Ship's officer or crew 0.025 Head has single marital status 0.028
(0.021) (0.027)




Other service occupation -0.015
(0.023) Region indicators, Region*Urban Y
Other occupation -0.08
(0.030)**
Num. of obs. 1614
R-squared 0.09
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Table displays coefficients (standard errors) from a single OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by location 
country. Unit of observation is a household. Other included independent variables are region indicators and region*urban interactions 
(coefficients not shown). All independent variables are recorded in July 1997 or before (except "Migrant job loss in 1998" indicator). See 
notes to Tables 3 and 4 for definitions of independent variables.
returnmig_tables  return_allcoeffsAppendix Table 3: Determinants of remittances received by household (Jan-June 1997)
   (Coefficients from OLS regression)
Dependent variable: Total household remittance receipts from Jan-June 1997 (000's of Philippine pesos)
Migrant characteristics
Has high school education 3.975
(3.679)
Has some post-secondary education 3.871
(3.606)














Migrant is male 21.508
(3.651)**









Num. of obs. 1627
R-squared 0.11
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Table displays coefficients (standard errors) from a single OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered 
by location country. Unit of observation is a household. All independent variables are recorded in July 1997 or before. See notes 
to Tables 3 and 4 for definitions of exchange rate shock and right-hand-side variables. Omitted migrant characteristics variables 
are "Has less than high school education" and "Production worker" occupation variable.
returnmig_tables  pred_remitAppendix Table 4: Impact of exchange rate shock on migrant returns, 1996-97 and 1997-98
(Using retrospective data in cross-sectional Survey on Overseas Filipinos, 1997 and 1998)
Panel A: July 1997 - June 1998 returns and current exchange rate shock
Sample: Migrants overseas in June 1997
Dependent variable: Indicator for migrant return by June 1998 (1 if returned, 0 otherwise)
Specifications
(1) (2)
Exchange rate shock (Jun 97 - Jun 98) -0.204 -0.222
(0.091)** (0.086)***
Other included independent variables:
Controls for migrant and household -Y
     characteristics
R-squared 0.01 0.05
Num. of obs. in both columns: 2,197
Panel B: July 1996 - June 1997 returns and future exchange rate shock
Sample: Migrants overseas in June 1996
Dependent variable: Indicator for migrant return by June 1997 (1 if returned, 0 otherwise)
Specifications
(1) (2)
Exchange rate shock (Jun 97 - Jun 98) -0.055 -0.053
(0.056) (0.050)
Other included independent variables:
Controls for migrant and household -Y
     characteristics
R-squared 0.00 0.04
Num. of obs. in both columns: 2,015
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Each column of table presents coefficient estimate on exchange rate shock in a separate OLS regression. Standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered by location country. Unit of observation is an individual migrant inferred as having been 
overseas in June 1997 (Panel A) or June 1996 (Panel B), as reported in Survey on Overseas Filipinos (1998 and 1997 rounds, 
respectively); see data appendix for inference rule. Dependent variable equal to 1 if migrant returned from overseas within 
following 12 months, and 0 otherwise. (Means of dependent variables for 1997 and 1998 samples are 0.098 and 0.106, 
respectively.) Exchange rate shock is change in Philippine pesos per currency unit where overseas worker was located. Change 
is average of 12 months leading to Jun 1998 minus average of 12 months leading to Jun 1997, divided by the latter (e.g., 10% 
increase is 0.1).
"Controls for migrant and household characteristics" are:  indicators for months away as of June of previous year (12-23, 24-35, 
37 or more; 0-11 omitted); indicators for highest education level completed (high school, some college, college or more; less 
than high school omitted); relationship to HH head (female head or spouse of head, daughter, son, other relation; male head 
omitted); years of age; indicator for location in "immigration destination" (see note to Table 2 for list of countries); log of 1996 
per capita income in migrant's location country; five indicators for household head's highest level of education completed 
(elementary, some high school, high school, some college, and college or more; less than elementary omitted).
returnmig_tables  pretestFigure 1: Mean return rate of migrants from Philippine households, by size of exchange rate shock
 (Jul 1997 - Jun 1998)
NOTES-- Unit of observation is a household. Sample includes 1,614 Philippine households with a migrant working overseas in June 1997 (see Data 
Appendix for details on sample construction). Solid line is migrant return rate; dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered 
by location of household's eldest overseas worker). "Exchange rate shock" is change in Philippine pesos per currency unit where overseas worker was 
located in Jun 1997. Change is average of 12 months leading to Jun 1998 minus average of 12 months leading to Jun 1997, divided by the latter (e.g., 
10% increase is 0.1). If household has more than one overseas worker in Jun 1997, exchange rate shock variable is average change in exchange rate 
across household's overseas workers. "Migrant return rate" is number of household's migrant workers who returned between Jul 1997 and Jun 1998 
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NOTES-- Exchange rates are as of last day of each month. Data source is Bloomberg L.P.
Figure 2: Exchange Rates in Selected Locations of Overseas Filipinos, July 1996 to October 1998









































































)Appendix Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c: Optimal consumption and savings over the life-cycle 
1a: Unconstrained investor: f=6
Optimal number of periods of saving before investment (t s*): 11
Optimal number of periods working overseas (t m*): 14
Investment in enterprise: 42.35
1b: Target-earner: f=3.5 1c: Non-investor: f=2
Optimal number of periods of saving before investment (t s*): 12 Optimal number of periods of saving before investment (t s*): (No investment)
Optimal number of periods working overseas (t m*): 12 Optimal number of periods working overseas (t m*): 3
Investment in enterprise: 40.5 Investment in enterprise: (No investment)
NOTES: Optimal values of choice variables chosen from the following sets: t s, t m from integers in the range {0,1,…,20}; s 1, s 2 from discrete values in the range {0, 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.98, 0.99, 1}. Assumes within-period utility function is U(C)=C
α. Parameter 







































































































































Consumption Savings rateAppendix Figure 2: Optimal periods before return migration and household investment
by foreign wage level
Legend:
NOTES: Results from numerical simulation; see notes to previous appendix figure for details.
Optimal periods overseas (t m*)



















sAppendix Figures 3a and 3b: Theoretical impact of exchange rate shock
 on return migration
3a: 1-period return rate with and without exchange rate shock
3b: Difference in return rate between households without and with exchange rate shock
No exchange rate shock 50% exchange rate shock
NOTES: Exchange rate shock raises both the foreign wage and accumulated assets held overseas by 50%. Shock 
assumed to occur at very beginning of a period (period j), with overseas work and enterprise investment decision 
assumed fixed in period j. "1-period return rate" is fraction of migrants overseas who return immediately after the 
period of the exchange rate shock (period j), so as to be working domestically in period j+1. For each level of the 




























































eAppendix Figures 4a and 4b: Theoretical impact of exchange rate shock
on household investment
4a: 1-period investment rate, with and without exchange rate shock
4b: Change in 1-period investment rate
No exchange rate shock 50% exchange rate shock
NOTES: Exchange rate shock raises both the foreign wage and accumulated assets held overseas by 50%. Shock 
assumed to occur at very beginning of a period (period j), with overseas work and enterprise investment decision 
assumed fixed in period j. "1-period investment rate" is fraction of households making enterprise investment 
immediately after the period of the exchange rate shock (period j), so enterprise is operating in period j+1. For 
each level of the foreign wage, households assumed uniformly distributed across elapsed periods of life. See first 





































































eAppendix Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c: Theoretical impact of exchange rate shock on return migration (borrowing constraint relaxed)
5a: Optimal periods overseas by foreign wage level (average across households)
5b: 1-period return rate with and without exchange rate shock 5c: Change in 1-period return rate
NOTES: Prior to period 1, households assumed able to borrow amount they would have invested in borrowing constraint case (Figure 4), or the minimum investment threshold (m) if a non-investor. Exchange rate shock raises both the 
foreign wage and accumulated assets held overseas by 50%. Shock assumed to occur at very beginning of a period (period j), with overseas work and enterprise investment decision assumed fixed in period j. "1-period return rate" is 
fraction of migrants overseas who return immediately after the period of the exchange rate shock (period j), so as to be working domestically in period j+1. For each level of the foreign wage, households assumed uniformly distributed 
across elapsed periods of life. See first appendix figure for other notes.
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